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Film policy often attempts to strike a balance between sustaining a national film 
industry and producing culturally distinctive films. It represents a battleground upon 
which policy makers, cultural critics, industry professionals and the general public 
negotiate the substance and meaning of national cinema. Using the national cinema 
discourse, this essay looks at the films policies of France, Canada and Korea, and 
examines the way film policies in these countries impact the production, distribution 
and exhibition of films in these countries. It then traces the development of film 
policy in Hong Kong since the handover, and argues that Hong Kong's film policy 
evolved in tandem with a growing self awareness of the city's unique cultural identity, 
and as a result Hong Kong's film policy had changed from an industry and trade 
centred approach in which film is treated like any commodity to one that takes into 
consideration film's cultural value. These changes came at a time when Hong Kong 
cinema is under increasing threat from the downturn in the industry and from the 
growing influence of mainland China in terms of film financing and censorship. The 
recent establishment of the Film Development Council and a HK$300 million Film 
Development Fund can be seen as not only an attempt to revive the fortune of the film 
















Prior to the mid-1990s, Hong Kong had virtually no film p o l i c y � T h i s was a 
remarkable fact, considering the territory was once the third largest film producer in 
the world, supplying filmic entertainment for the Hong Kong population and much of 
the Chinese Diaspora in the decades after the Second World War. It was only with 
the industry's rapid decline starting from the mid-1990s--due to a variety of factors 
including dwindling audience numbers, piracy and the Asian economic 
downturn—that industry professionals clamoured for government intervention. In 
response, the government had, and continues to, put into place various policy 
measures aimed at assisting the film industry. These policies have met with mixed 
success over the years in terms of arresting the slow but steady decline of the film 
industry. In March, 2007, the government announced its latest initiative, the 
establishment of a $300 million film fund to offer production loans to small to 
medium-sized film productions, which, when implemented, will represent the first 
time the Hong Kong government has directly invested in the film industry. This 
latest film policy initiative signals a significant shift away from the laissez-faire 
‘ W i t h the possible exception, albeit a minor one, of censorship. Prior to the implementation of the 
three-tier film classification scheme in 1987，only about 20 films were banned outright in Hong Kong 
because of political content between 1973 and 1987 (Darrell W. Davis and Yeh Yueh-yu, "Warning! 
Category III," Film Quarterly, Vol. no. 54, issue no. 4，20), which presumably included both local and 
well as foreign productions. In view of its modest impact on the film industry in Hong Kong, I will not 
consider censorship in this study. 
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approach during the colonial period to one of increasing intervention after 1997. 
No less remarkable was the change in the way cinema has been discoursed by 
policy makers, industry professionals, cultural critics and other interested parties in 
the past ten years. Over this period, there has been a burgeoning awareness that 
cinema was more than just a commodity, and a growing self-consciousness about the 
medium as a means of cultural expression. This was not to say that this idea was 
totally absent in Hong Kong prior to 1997，or that no Hong Kong filmmakers had 
cultural/ artistic aspirations before the Handover. Rather, a case can be made that 
since 1997，as the issue of cultural identity increasingly gained currency in Hong 
Kong, cinema was more and more often viewed in terms of local identity and this, in 
turn, influenced the way film policy was conceived and implemented during this 
period. Compare, for example, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa's assertion in his 
policy address of 1998 that the Hong Kong film industry needs to "upgrade itself if it 
was to capture a larger share of the market"^ with the statement from the Secretary 
for Commerce, Industry and Technology Wong Wing Ping made in March, 2007, 
stating that "film is not just entertainment, but also reflects local culture, and that 
limited governmental support will strengthen the development of the industry".^ 
2 Tung Chee Hwa, "Policy Address 1998”， 
http://72.14.235.104/search?q 二 cache:h4GLl KxuZoYJ:unpanl .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/document 
•s/APCITY/UNPAN007452.pdf+tung+chee+hwa+film+inciustrv&hl=zh-TW&ct=clnk&cd=6&g�=hk, 
accessed 25 May 2007. 
3 "Wong Wing Ping admits film development fund may lose money", Sing Tao Daily News, 11 March 
2007， 
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By stressing cinema's cultural significance as an alibi for public subvention in 
the film industry, Hong Kong's policy makers have borrowed from, or tapped into, 
discourses on national cinema that have been around in many countries since as far 
back as the early part of the last century."^ These discourses are concerned with a 
particular way of looking at cinema, and with the role cinema plays, or was seen to 
play, within a geographical territory. National cinema is not only a descriptive 
discourse, looking back at the catalogue of films produced in a geographical territory 
and connecting them with the cultural character of that society, but also a prescriptive 
one, concerned with utilizing society's resources towards producing certain kinds of 
cinematic productions. Examining how the national cinema discourse influences 
film policy allows us to assess underlying assumptions behind such policies, provide a 
critical perspective on their implementation and make predictions upon its outcome. 
This essay is primarily concerned with the relationship between the descriptive 
and prescriptive dimensions of the national cinema discourse, in the way conceptions 
about Hong Kong cinema influenced the development of film policy over the past ten 
years. It will argue that the discourse of national cinema�，which ighlights national 
identity and cohesion, has been utilized to bolster the claim that Hong Kong cinema is 
http://www.singtao.com/index_archive.asp?d_str=2007031 l&htmlpage=main&news=03 l lao l3 .h tml 
(accessed 24 May 2007). “王7S平認電影基圣或触錢”，星島曰報 
4 See, for example, Andrew Higson，Waving the Flag: Constructing a National Cinema in Britain 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 
5 Although the term in usually associated with sovereign nations, this essay ascribes Hong Kong 
cinema with 'national' status because after 1949，it developed separately from the Mainland. Its 
unique geo-political situation also endows its cinema with a distinctive character. 
6 
culturally significant and that government funding is both necessary and useful for the 
development of the film industry. Yet certain types of national cinema discourses, 
by valorizing certain types of films and favouring some images of the nation, 
problematize the concepts of both nation and cinema. Film policy, by devoting 
public resources toward producing national cinematic texts, puts these problematics 
into sharp focus, raising such questions as what exactly qualifies as a national text? 
Given that policy inevitably involves resource allocation, why should some type of 
film productions or some sectors of the industry benefit from funding while others not? 
In view of the contested nature of the idea of ‘nation，，is it possible to resist the 
imposition of the ideals of the hegemonic group? In view of globalization and the 
ever increasing pressure on nations to liberalize trade, how can nations justify 
subsidizing this particular industry? Hong Kong film policy is still in its formative 
stage, and many of these questions have not yet been raised, much less resolved, and 
this thesis is a timely and much needed interrogation into these areas. In the next 
chapter I will look at how film policies in three countries, France, Korea and Canada 
evolve to tackle some of these questions, and then turn my attention to the 
development in Hong Kong film policy in the following chapter. Since the national 
cinema discourse forms a central part of this essay, it is useful to take a look at the 
development of this discourse. 
7 
The National Cinema Discourse 
Kristin Thompsn points out that claims about national cinema first emerged 
in Europe after 1915,6 in countries that saw the increasing domination of American 
films during and after World War One. In order to distinguish European cinema 
from their American counterpart, filmmakers and critics sought to promote alternate 
aesthetics linked to supposedly indigenous cultural traditions. In Britain, for 
example, there was a concern to associate cinema with other established arts such as 
literature and theatre starting from the 1910s and into the 1920s.7 Later on, national 
cinema came to be associated with particular cinematic styles with links to the social 
and/or political reality of that nation, such as German expressionism and British 
documentary realism of the 1920s and 1930s. With the development of the auteur 
theory, national cinemas were organized around 'great' works by ‘major，directors, 
like Ingmar Bergman in Sweden, Jean-Luc Godard and Francois Truffaut in France 
and Howard Hawks and John Ford in America.^ In the 1970s and 1980s, the influx of 
semiotics, Lacanian psychoanalysis and structuralism into film criticism led to 
national cinemas being analyzed in terms of 'national psyches', as with Martha 
Wolfenstein and Nathan Leite' Movies: A Psychological Study (1971 In all of 
6 Kristin Thompson, ""Nation, National Identity and the International Cinema", Film History 8(1996): 
259-260 
7 Andrew Higson, Waving the Flag: Constructing a National Cinema in Britain (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), 15 
8 Mette Hjort & Scott Mackenzie, ed. Cinema & Nation (London & New York: Routledge, 2000),3 
9 Ibid., 3 
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these approaches, the idea that there is something essentially German or British about 
German and British cinema was never questioned.� 
With the publication of Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities in 1991, 
national cinemas came to be conceptualized around the notion of the nation as an 
imagined community. ‘ ^  According to Anderson, the collective consumption of 
• • • 12 mediated texts creates a sense of national identity for people within a nation-state. 
Although the focus of Anderson's work is concerned mainly with print media, film 
scholars have applied his insights to national cinema, analyzing the way in which 
cinematic texts have been used to construct national identity. For Susan Hayward, 
cinema functions as 'the articulation of a nation', even if it subverts the notion of 
nationhood, it still addresses it, albeit negatively or o p p o s i t i o n a l l y � � Cinema 
participates in the project of nation building, and the audience is interpellated into a 
certain national identity, and defines themselves as a national ‘us’ against other 
national 'thems'. In his study of British national cinema, Andrew Higson looks at 
how certain British films from the 1920s and 1930s highlight themes of family and 
community as against the more individualistic ethics of Hollywood, while heritage 
films of the period project a stable, spectacular image of history, imagined from the 
丨。Ibid., 3 
“ I b i d . , 2 
12 Ibid” 23 
13 Susan Hayward, French National Cinema (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), x 
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present point of viewJ"^ In the process, differences and divisions including gender, 
class and ethnicity are written out of existence. For this reason, Higson is skeptical 
of the homogenizing tendencies he thinks is inherent in national cinema (at least for 
Britain), and suggests that 'the parameters of a national cinema should be drawn at the 
site of consumption as much as the site of production of films'/^ which includes not 
only films that are produced in a nation-state, but also all the films that are watched 
by its audience. Yet John Hill points out that a distinction should be made between 
cinema in a nation state and a state's national cinema if one is to use the term as a 
normative concept and argue on cultural grounds that a state ought to have its own 
national cinema.'^ 
National cinema is part of what Anthony D. Smith calls the 'national cultural': 
the cultural core of memories, values, customs, myths and symbols that gives a nation 
a sense of itself.'^ Thus many politicians, policy makers, interest groups, industry 
professionals and audiences could be attached, for different reasons, to the national 
1 Q 
cinema project. Politicians and policy makers find national cinema useful for 
creating a sense of community among the populace, and instill the mores, outlook and 
14 Andrew Higson, Waving the Flag: Constructing a National Cinema in Britain, 274 
15 Andrew Higson, "The Concept of National Cinema", Screen, vol. 30, no. 4，Autumn 1989, 36 
16 John Hill, "The Issue of National Cinema and British Film Production", Duncan Petrie, ed.，New 
Questions of British Cinema, (London: BFI Publishing, 1992), 10 
17 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 129-139 
18 Tom 0 'Regan , Australian National Cinema (London: Routledge, 1996)，67 
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continuing hegemony of the governing class upon the masses. ^ ^ Cinema, as a 
prestigious art form that attracts a great deal of media attention, can also enhance a 
nation's image internationally through participation in film festivals or via theatrical 
distribution, and have a knock-on promotional effect upon other industries like 
manufacturing and tourism?^ Film industry professionals, in advocating national 
cinema, are often concerned with utilizing public policy and resources to counter 
foreign (usually American) competition and bolster indigenous film industries. 
Lastly, audiences often display conflicting loyalties. They have a preference for 
indigenous films for which they have a linguistic and cultural affinity, but at the same 
time enjoy Hollywood films that provide superior audio-visual excitement and 
entertainment v a l u e . 2 � T h e y are also broadly supportive of policies that give support 
to the local film industry.22 
Many scholars find national cinema a useful concept for analyzing film policy. 
0'Regan points out the idea that the film sector require special state aid depends on 
"constructing, then having the public recognize that film production as a needy, 
disadvantaged sector conferring sound and tangible national benef i t s" .23 These 
benefits, as mentioned above, include enhancing social cohesion and fostering a sense 
19 Ian Jarvie, "National Cinema: A theoretical assessment" in Mette Hjort & Scott Mackenzie, ed. 
Cinema & Nation, 81 
‘ 20 fom 0’Regan, Australian National Cinema, 24 
2�Eun-Mee Kim, "Market Competition and Cultural Tensions between Hollywood and the Korean 
Film Industry", The International Journal of Media Management, 6 (3&4)，209 
22 Ibid, 25 
23 Tom 0'Regan, Austi-alian National Cinema, 120 
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of community among the populace. But the concept of national cinema can also be 
used critically, as a way of interrogating the idea of the nation as well as cinema itself, 
for the national cinema discourse, by deconstructing national cinema into different 
categories, provides insights into the way they interact and produce ideas about the 
nation and cinema. According to Stephen Crofts, national cinema encompasses 
production, audiences, discourses, textuality, national-cultural specificity, culturally 
specific genres and the role of the state.24 These categories are often taken for 
granted, or simply overlooked, in the usual debates about film policy. Examining the 
national cinema discourse, therefore, is useful for interrogating film policy from a 
critical angle, so that the main concern is not simply the effectiveness of particular 
policies, but the underlying assumptions behind them. 
Hong Kong Cinema as National Cinema 
Although Hong Kong is not a politically sovereign nation, many scholars have 
characterized Hong Kong cinema as national cinema. Yingchi Chu analyzes Hong 
Kong cinema according to five different typologies (themselves derived from Susan 
Hayward in her study on French cinema), including film narratives, film genres, codes 
24 Mette Hjort & Scott Mackenzie, ed. Cinema & Nation, 4 
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and conventions, gesturality and morphology, and the star as sign, and argues that 
Hong Kong cinema possesses a cultural specificity that makes it quasi-national.^^ 
Chu theorizes that at least since the 1970s，there had been a distinct community 
awareness and a self awareness of the unique geo-political identity in Hong Kong 
cinema，26 due to the fact that the character of Hong Kong cinema has been shaped by 
the "shifts in the triangular relationship between the British colonizer, the Chinese 
motherland, and Hong Kong." Although Chu sees the reversion to Chinese 
sovereignty after 1997 as having little impact on the quasi-national cinema in Hong 
Kong,28 I will argue that although the change in political sovereignty did not threaten 
the city's cinematic identity, the continual downturn in the film industry after the 
handover and the consequent reliance on the mainland Chinese market had made it 
less and less autonomous and independent. 
Hong Kong cinema had always had to rely on exporting its products for a 
significant part of its income, but after the decline of the Taiwanese market in the 
early 1990s and the shrinking of Asian markets after the Asian Financial Crisis^^, the 
region began to focus on China as its most significant export market. With the 
signing of the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) in 2003, China's 
25 Yingchi Chu, Hong Kong Cinema: Colonizer, Motherland and 5e//'(New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 
2003)广63 • 
26 Ibid, 97 
27 Ibid, 119 
28 Ibid., 120 
29 Ibid., 122-3 
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market became open to Hong Kong films. But to be granted permission to be 
exhibited in China, Hong Kong films must first be approved by Chinese censors, and 
additionally, Hong Kong-Chinese co-productions also have to have their scripts 
cleared by censors before being allowed to shoot. The Hong Kong film industry had 
always enjoyed wide artistic freedom, and very few subject matters had been 
off-limits. In the past few years, the industry has had to labour under strict 
censorship rules for the first time in its history, and this in turn greatly affected the 
character of the Hong Kong cinema. In addition, mainland companies have also 
become one of the main sources of financing for Hong Kong films, and they are able 
to dictate the type of genres and stars best suited to the China market. Thus at least 
three of the five typologies of Hong Kong's national cinema, including film genres, 
codes and conventions, and the star as sign are directly or indirectly altered as a result 
ofCEPA. 
The establishment of the Film Development Council in April, 2007 and the 
HK$300 million Film Development Fund can be seen as measures to counter the 
effects of CEPA, by producing small to medium budget features to balance out the 
big-budget co-productions now dominating the Hong Kong market. Hong Kong's 
film policy since the handover represents the tension between sustaining a national 
film industry and maintaining its distinctive character. 
14 
Methodology and Scope 
This thesis will utilize discourse analysis to look at the film policies of France, 
Canada and Korea. These countries are chosen as examples from three different 
continents, all of which has had a long history of using film policy to bolster its 
domestic film history in the face of the dominance of Hollywood. I will look at 
these countries' film policies from the point of view of recent discussions surrounding 
national cinema, and examine the ideological implications of these policies, in 
particular issues surrounding national identity, cultural diversity and the development 
of cultural industries. 
In discussing film policy in Hong Kong, I will make use of primary documents 
including policy statements, consultant reports, as well as interviews with industry 
professionals and government officials. In addition, secondary sources such as 
newspaper reportage and journal articles will be consulted. Finally, a third layer of 
texts consists of academic discourse and theories regarding post-colonial Hong Kong 
identity and Hong Kong cinema will be consulted. In addition, I will take a close 
look at a number of consultation reports commissioned since the handover on the film 
industry and creative industries in general, which show a growing awareness of the 
cultural significance of Hong Kong cinema and the need to preserve and develop the 
‘ 15 
indigenous film industry. Together, these documents will provide insights on the 
relationship between national cinema and film policy in Hong Kong. 
In tracing the development of film policy in Hong Kong, it will become clear 
from policy documents, consultation papers and official statements the way in which 
cinema is brought into the sphere of governmentality. As Tony Bennett remarks, the 
process by which cultural policy is formulated in the modern state defies traditional 
formulations of ‘top down' or 'bottom up，�。，but involves a more nuanced relation of 
mutual dependency between government and the community. Community is not 
understood as a naturally occurring body, but one constituted by its relations to 
government. In policy formulation, for example, pressure groups claiming to 
represent certain segment of the community are formed to lobby the government for 
their own interests. Within the Hong Kong context, this essay will trace the process 
by which cinema becomes a subject of governmentality through a dialogical process 
between policy makers and members of the 'film community' in which Hong Kong 
cinema is recognized as a field worthy of and in need of public intervention in the 
form of progressively more explicit policy initiatives both before and after 1997. 
In many countries in the world, justification for film policies typically revolves 
around support for the industry and support for culture.^' Advocates for the former 
Tony Bennett, Culture, A Reformer 's Science. (London ； Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage Publications, 
C1998)，195 
John Hill, "The Issue of National Cinema and British Film Production", Duncan Petrie, ed., New 
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see a nationally-based film industry with a sizable national audience as the primary 
goal of film policies. They typically cite the economic contribution of the film 
industry, both in terms of the revenue generated by film and related cultural products 
or the potential for job creation. Advocates for the latter seek to justify film policies 
according to the cultural benefits of films upon the national psyche, or the prestige 
generated by certain types of film productions. While not necessarily opposed, there 
is often a tension between the two funding alibis, since in practice they support two 
very different kinds of f i l m s t h e commercially popular and the artistic/cultural 
films.32 The debates and issues surrounding film policies in France, Canada and 
Korea as outlined in Chapter 2 will serve to illustrate the way these countries come to 
terms with the industry/culture dichotomy. Another closely related issue is that of 
cultural diversity. Many film policy advocates claim that such policies are put in 
place so as to ensure that there is sufficient diversity of film products on the market,^^ 
while some critics are skeptical of this assertion, and suggest that encouraging imports 
from other countries may be just as effective for achieving cultural diversity.34 All 
three of the countries surveyed have to tackle this issue in their respective film 
policies, and their work is further complicated by the current neo-liberalist turn in 
Questions of British Cinema, 10 
32 Which is not to say that some films can't be both popular and artistic, but they tend to be the 
exception rather than the rule. 
“ H i l l , John, "The Issue of National Cinema and British Film Production", 18 
34 Andrew Higson, "Limiting Imagination of National Cinema" in Mette Hjort & Scott Mackenzie, ed. 
Cinema & Nation, 71 
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world economic discourse, which curbs the amount of control nations have on their 
economies. 
The issues confronted by France, Canada and Korea with the implementation of 
their respective film policies are also relevant to Hong Kong. As outlined in Chapter 
3, it is evident that in the past ten years, Hong Kong's film policy had gradually 
moved from one in which industry support was the main concern to one where 
cultural considerations take precedence. As the Hong Kong government begins 
direct investment in film productions, many of the debates concerning the 
industry/culture divide that had been central to film policy discourse in other countries 
will likely be played out in the region as well. Like many countries in the world, 
Hong Kong's film exhibition sector is also faced with the domination of Hollywood 
blockbusters at the box office，which has the effect of squeezing out small and 
medium sized local productions and reducing filmic diversity. In addition, Hong 
Kong cinema also has to come to terms with another national presence—mainland 
China, which further complicates the identity of its national cinema. Tracking the 
way Hong Kong film policy and policy discourse address these issues will form the 
main scope of this essay. 
Research Questions and purpose 
18 
The focus of this study is the evolution of Hong Kong film policy from 1997 to 
the present. It will attempt to establish that Hong Kong's film policy evolved in 
tandem with a growing self awareness of a Hong Kong identity, both in the social and 
cultural realm. It will use the national cinema discourse to untangle the implications 
and effects of this self awareness upon film policy in Hong Kong. It will use case 
studies from France, Canada and Korea to examine the relations between film policy 
and cultural identity, cultural diversity and the film industry in general. 
This study is significant in the following aspects: 
a) In the past ten years there have been many changes and developments in Hong 
Kong's film policy. While there has been plenty of textual analysis on Hong Kong 
cinema, and a few works about the region's film industry, there have been no studies 
on its film policy. This is the first systematic and empirical study of Hong Kong 
film policy over this period. 
b) Looking at Hong Kong's film policy through the national cinema discourse will 
help explain how and why it has evolved this way. 
c) Examining and comparing the film policies of other countries will provide a 
framework for predicting the future development of Hong Kong film policy in the 




Thomas Elsaesser remarked that national cinema made sense only as a relation, 
not an essence, for it was dependent on other kinds of filmmaking, and operated in 
the context of Hollywood.^^ Before looking into the film policies of France, Canada 
and Korea and how they affect their respective national cinemas, it is therefore useful 
to briefly examine the state of the world film industry, in particular the dominance of 
the American film industry. Hollywood's dominance of global film markets was 
overwhelming and undeniable: Hollywood films accounted for some 75% of total 
box office in Western Europe^^, 64.5% in Japan^^ and 81 % in Australia^^ Yet this 
dominance was not completely the result of free market forces and audience 
preference for supposedly superior products, but based on historical, political and 
economic factors played out over the past century and into the present. The US 
government, despite its insistence that it had no official cultural policy, had 
consistently aided the film industry with diplomatic maneuvers (as, for example, by 
blocking moves by foreign countries to impose quota restrictions on American films) 
and hidden subsidies in the form of tax incentives or fi-ee use of public services, 
Tom 0 'Regan , Australian National Cinema, 48 
36 1995 figures, Toby Miller et al.，Global Hollywood, (London : British Film Institute, 2001),7 
“ 2 0 0 0 figures. Source: Centre de National de la Cinematographie，as cited by Allen J. Scott, 
"Hollywood in the Era of Globalization", YaleGlobal, 29 November 2002, 
http://valeglobal.vale.edu/article.print?id=479. accessed 9 December 2006 
2005 figures. Source: Australian Film Commission, 
http://www.afc.gov.au/GTP/wcfilmxcountrv.htmK accessed 9 December 2006 
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among other measures.^^ The American film industry used oligopolistic practices 
such as block booking to encourage exports, while keeping foreign films out of 
domestic screens to entrench its market dominance.Furthermore, the nature of the 
film industry, which required high capital expenditure and involves high risk, makes 
entry into the market extremely difficult and ensured the maintenance of the status 
quo. 
In addition to the above factors，a number of economic variables have been used 
to explain Hollywood's global dominance. The term "cultural discount" refers to 
the fact that audiences have a preference for indigenous cultural products, and that 
foreign cultural products suffer a discount in value.''^ Also, studies indicate that the 
popular appeal of films increases with higher investment in production costs.42 Both 
factors tend to give advantage to markets with a large home market base, and America 
is the largest market in the world in monetary terms. American films can recoup the 
cost of production alone, which allows them to be priced more competitively in 
foreign markets. The market potential of American films is further strengthened by 
the fact that English language films suffer less from the cultural discount factor than 
films in other languages."^^ 
39 Toby Miller and George Yudice, Cultural Policy, (London : SAGE, 2002)，37 
4 � I b i d , 36 
41 Eun-Mee Kim, "Market Competition and Cultural Tensions between Hollywood and the Korean 
Film Industry", 209 
42 Ibid. 208 
43 Ibid. 209 
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Since the 1980s，there had been a trend towards corporate concentration in the 
United States44，and film studios have become subsidiaries within horizontally and 
vertically integrated media empires with a global reach. Theatrical exhibition now 
represented the first in a series of exhibition windows that also include satellite, cable 
and pay-per-view television, all of which proliferated throughout North America, 
Europe and, to a lesser extent, Asia as a result of deregulation and new technology, as 
well as home video sales. Product licensing, commercial tie-ins and theme park 
rides represented other lucrative revenue streams. These developments have had a 
profound effect on the style and content of Hollywood films, as well as the way they 
are distributed and marketed over the last two decades. 
This is the background against which France, Canada and Korea formulate and 
continue to shape their respective film policies in recent years. The national cinema 
of these countries must define themselves against foreign, mainly American products, 
and film policies represented the cinematic aspirations of policy makers, industrial 
interests and the public. These three countries are chosen for the present study not 
only because they are geographically, historically and socially disparate, but also 
because they all have a long and evolved history of dealing with the threat of 
Hollywood on their respective indigenous film industries, and have responded with 
44 Nicholas Gamham, Capitalism and Communication一Global Culture and the Economics of 
Information, (London: Sage, 1990), 206 
22 
clear，identifiable and explicit film policies that could be described and analyzed. 
Film industries are comprised of production, distribution and exhibition sectors, and 
this study will focus on efforts to boost indigenous film production in France, the 
tension between indigenous production and foreign-owned distribution in Canada, 
and the effort to foster a national film industry through exhibition quotas in Korea. 
The film policies in these countries represent a constant push and pull between 
sustaining a film industry and making culturally distinctive film productions as policy 
makers, cultural critics, industry professionals and the general public negotiate the 
substance and meaning of national cinema. I will look in detail at the way film 
policies in these countries interact with issues of national sovereignty and cultural 
identity within the context of the national cinema discourse. 
Film Policy in France 
Film policy in France evolved gradually over the past century in response to 
international events and pressure from the film industry. Prior to World War 1， 
France was the world's leading film producer, and French films dominated the 
international market, capturing as much as 90 percent of global film businesses. 
During the war, France's production resources were diverted to serve the war effort, 
Tyler Cowen，"French Kiss O f f ~ H o w protectionism has hurt French Films", Reason Magazine 
Online, http://reason.com/9807/fe.cowen.shtmK accessed 4 Oct 2006. p. 3 
23 
and American film producers stepped in to fill the void，resulted in American films 
flooding the French market by the end of the decade. Throughout the 20s and 30s, 
France tussled repeatedly with the United Sates in the continual effort to resist 
Hollywood's conquest of French screens through various import restriction 
measures before finally settling on screen quotas, which restricted a proportion of 
screen time for indigenous products."^^ During World War II, the Vichy regime 
adopted from the Nazis a policy of rigid control with regards to cultural production, 
including cinema, by guaranteeing financing for approved projects and banning 
American films outright."^^ 
In the post war period, France experimented with both screen quota and import 
quota (limiting the number of American film imports) to protect French films，and in 
the 1960s introduced an elaborate and generous system of subsidies to promote film 
production. Since 1946, French film policy had been administered by the Centre 
national de la cinematographie (CNC)，which provided numerous financial support 
schemes aimed at film production, distribution as well as exhibition"^^. For the sake 
of brevity，this essay will mainly discuss production support and its implication for 
French national cinema. 
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Funding from the CNC came partially from a tax on all cinema tickets, the Taxe 
Speciale Additionnelle (TSA), which amounted to 11% of ticket price. The TSA was 
paid into a special fund, the compte de soutien, which supported two main funding 
mechanisms, the soutien automatique and the avance sur recettes"^^. The former was 
based on a film's box office receipts. As its name suggested, film producers 
automatically received 120% of the TSA collected on a particular film. This money, 
which amounted to some 14% of a film's box office, could be used to pay for 
deferrals or，as was more often the case, finance a producer's next project. Since 
only French film producers were eligible for the soutien automatique, the system in 
effect used part of the box office from foreign (mostly American) films to subsidize 
French film production. 
The avance sur recettes was theoretically a loan payable against box office 
receipts, but since only about 10% of recipients achieved the required level of income, 
the loan was effectively a grant. The awarding of the avance sur recettes was 
adjudicated by a panel of industry professionals, and was usually given to first time 
filmmakers or films that have cultural or artistic merit.^^ 
Since both the soutien automatique and the avance sur recettes were funded 
from the TSA, which was linked to box office receipts, the system came under threat 
Ibid. p. 105-6 
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in the late 1980s when cinema audience shrank, theatres closed down, and the share 
of French films slipped to 30% for the first time in history, while the US film share 
reached a post-war high of 58%.^^ However, a number of important policies 
introduced since then had completely transformed the fortunes of the French film 
industry and revered its box-office slide vis-a-vis American films, the most significant 
one being a series of legislations passed in 1986 calling for each television station to 
pay a fixed portion of its turnover into the compte de soutien. Further legislations, 
passed in 1989 and 1990, respectively, required the then newly privatized television 
station TFl to devote 3% of its turnover to film production,^^ while the new pay 
television channel, Canal Plus was required by law to pay 20% of its pre-tax revenue 
to subsidize the film i ndus t ry . The amount of capital available for the production 
of French films thus increased substantially, and both the number of film and the 
average budget for these films went up. 
Another policy worth considering was the creation of tax shelter funds devoted 
exclusively to film production. Known as Societes pour le Financement de 
I 'Industrie Cinematographie et Audiovisuelle (SOFICA), the scheme is meant to 
widen the capital base for the film industry. It allowed investors to choose among a 
52 Ibid. p. 34 
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number of investment funds, rather than investing directly on specific films.^^ When 
it was first introduced, money from the SOFICAs accounted for roughly 10% of all 
investment in French films, although the numbers have fallen drastically in recent 
years.56 While the SOFICA scheme was intended mainly for independent films of 
medium to small scale budgets, the Ministry of Culture also set up a fonds de garantie 
in 1989 aimed at encouraging the production of big budget features (with a budget of 
at least 50 million francs) that were meant to compete with American blockbusters. 
The public guarantee fund covered between 50-70 per cent of losses of selected films. 
However, the scheme soon floundered when the initial batch of films produced were 
commercial failures and the fund of 30 million francs was soon exhausted.^^ 
Nevertheless, with hundreds of millions of dollars of television money flooding 
into the compte de soutien as well as direct investments from television and the 
SOFICAs, the number of film productions in France rose sharply from 101 in 1993 to 
183 in 2003.58 Aided by the rise in multiplexes, film attendance also jumped, from 
116 million spectators in 1992 to 195 million in 2004.59 Thus, the fortunes of the 
French film industry could be said to be reversed by a series of timely and expedient 
policies put into place since the late 1980s. 
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These policies were developed under circumstances perhaps unique to France. 
The Socialist government of Frangois Mitterrand was extremely sympathetic towards 
the arts, and the budget for the Ministry of Culture shot up by 79% the year after he 
came to office in 1982.^ *^  Interestingly the proportion of direct public spending on 
film remained quite low in relative to other areas such as theatre and museums, since 
the compte de soutien was not considered a part of tax revenue but a type of forced 
savings by the industry. The laws requiring television stations to contribute to the 
compte de soutien as well as invest directly in film productions were made after 
intense lobbying and behind-the-scenes maneuvering by industry professional 
organizations. While these measures undoubtedly boosted the level of film 
productions, many critics feel that French films today pale in comparison with those 
produced during the so-called 'Golden Age' of the 1930s or the French New Wave, 
and described the current state of French cinema as a 'cultural g h e t t o . T h e y 
blame television itself for the decline in the quality of films, and for weakening its 
public appeal, arguing that by being so readily available, twenty four hours a day, and 
re-run again and again, television has eroded the ‘aura’ of films. In order to fulfil 
quota requirements, television stations purchased a great many cheap but mediocre 
films for broadcast, which served to instill a negative image of the national cinema to 
6o Eling Kim, p. 10 
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r 0 
the public. Moreover, television had imposed its own aesthetic standards on films. 
As the founder of MK2, Martin Karmitz, notes in his autobiography, 
Nowadays, people sell films before they make them. They sell 
them.. .mainly to television companies [...] And that means they want 
films that are 'safe', that have nothing to say. [...] They steer clear of 
anything that might upset people, anything new or off-centre - in other 
words, creative. 
Such comments reflect certain ideas about the social purpose of film versus 
television (challenging as opposed to safe, creative as opposed to bland), as well as 
systems of valuation that pits certain films of yesteryear against certain ones today. 
These ideas and valuations may be useful for making aesthetic distinctions about 
different films, but are of questionable utility for deciding which films best represent 
a nation. Tom O'Regan suggests that the dull, the bad and the popular are also part 
of national cinemas, alongside the prestigious and artistic, and they are part of any 
cinema, and any identity.^^ Of more relevance to the present discussion is whether 
French film policy contributes to the strength of the national cinema. 
The present film policy in France was conceived and implemented in the late 
1980s by the cultural minister Jack Lang with the backing of the powerful film lobby, 
yet the close ties between them has led many to question whether those policies 
benefit French cinema or just the film industry. Many of the policies under Plan 
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Lang were decidedly pro-market. For example, before 1989, the soutien 
automatique employed a gradated scale that favoured films with lower box office 
gross (those with a lower gross get a greater percentage of TSA generated by the film, 
while box office successes had their TSA refunds capped at 60%.)^^ Under Plan Lang, 
the automatic support rate was standardized, which in effect rewarded the most 
successful films and their producers and strengthened their domination while the 
amount awarded to smaller productions was not sufficient as incentives towards 
further productions.^^ 
Indeed, since the implementation of the Plan Lang, big budget films have taken 
a bigger share of the market. In 1982, the top ten French films at the box office took 
in 31% of the total share, but in 2000 the figure exceeded 50%, with most of the top 
films produced by large conglomerates like Gaumont and Pathe or produced in 
Aft 
partnership with other communications industry giants. One of the stated aims of 
the production aid system was to enhance cultural diversity by "favouring the 
production of different, independent and audacious feature films" and "encouraging 
the production of new directors' first films as a way of renewing artistic creation “.69 
But in effect，capturing a larger market share for French films became a greater 
66 Emmanuel Cocq and Patrick Messerlin, "The French Audiovisual Policy: Impact and Compatibility 





priority, even if it meant sacrificing film diversity. 
The close ties between the French state and media conglomerates were also 
problematic. After awarding Canal Plus with its first commercial license in 1984, 
Francoise Mitterand then appointed his Chief of Staff Andre Rousselet as Chairman 
and Managing Director. In 1994 the channel was granted a ten-year license 
extension without a call for competitive b i d s . T h i s represented a conscious effort 
on the part of the Socialist government to nurture strong French media companies 
capable of producing big budget blockbusters to counter American hegemony. 
But later on, when Canal Plus entered into co-production deals with Hollywood 
companies to produce American films such as JFK and Under Seige”, it became 
evident that corporate interests and cultural policy were not necessarily compatible. 
It was no wonder that when Canal Plus, one of the chief engines of France's 
cinematic renaissance, merged with Seagram, owners of Universal studios to form the 
multinational group Vivendi Universal in 2000 and became a player in Hollywood, 
72 
the company's CEO Jean-Marie Messier declared that "cultural exception is dead". 
In view of the ambiguity of the term 'cultural exception，，French policy makers 
have, in recent years, begun to use the term 'cultural diversity' to justify the country's 
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film policy, arguing that without it French cinema and television will be irmundated 
with homogeneous American cultural p r o d u c t s H o w e v e r , the paradox of the 
French film industry was that it had become increasingly dominated by a handful of 
large horizontally and vertically integrated corporations churning out blockbusters for 
mass consumption in much the same way as Hollywood studios. These corporations 
have grown up with the tacit approval of the government because their economy of 
scale offered the best chance of countering Hollywood hegemony, yet the large 
budget productions they produced and promoted ended up reducing the very cultural 
diversity that their CEOs publicly advoca t ed . 
To counter the homogenizing effects of the large corporations, the CNC was 
constantly obliged to tweak the system to make it easier for independent producers to 
make small and medium sized budget films. One proposal, for example, called for 
the SOFICAs to invest a minimum of 65% of its funds on independent productions.^^ 
Another plan, adopted in 2000, required Canal Plus to devote 45% of its investments 
to productions with a budget of 5.4 million euros or less.76 Yet for some critics, such 
plans merely exascerbated the current malaise of French cinema, which they 
considered to be a glut of mediocre productions. According to one estimate, of the 
147 French films produced in 1998，between thirty to forty did not have a distributor 
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the following year, and of the rest, a third had a minimal release, which usually meant 
a short run in multiplex in large urban centres/^ Some 75% of films did not earn 
back their investments^^, and there is little incentive for producers to cater to the 
market when they could finance a film with subsidies, television pre-sales and a small 
amount of private investment^^. By protecting its cinema with protectionist 
measures, some commentators feel that French films have lost touch with popular 
taste. Even though youths under the age of tewnty five account for almost 50% of 
film audiences, their needs were ill-served by the French film industry, so it was no 
wonder that many young people preferred watching American f i l m s . I n terms of 
box office figures, a few French hits drew most of the audience, while the majority of 
indegenous films, mostly in the small to medium-sized budget range flopped. 
There is little doubt that France values cinema as "one of the totems of French 
society”8i whose importance far exceeds its purely financial weight (which is about 
the same as the sale of ice cream in France.)^^ During the 1993 General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations, the French fought hard, and eventually 
succeeded, in winning the support of fellow European members to exclude cultural 
77 Anne Jackel, European Film Industries, (London: British Film Institute, 2003) p. 138. 
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products and services from trade liberalization measures.^^ Using the argument of 
'cultural exception，，the French claimed that culture was not simply goods, and that 
subsidies and measures such as the "Television without Frontiers" directive, which 
stipulated that all French television stations must carry at least 60% European 
programs, were necessary for maintaining national identity. 
When states take on the task of protecting national culture, it becomes 
imperative for them to define what constitutes 'nation' and 'culture'. Yet the French 
subsidy system was filled with loopholes and inconsistencies that problematized both 
the notions of nationhood and culture. For example, many heritage films based on 
French literary classics or historical figures were seen as quintessentially 
representatives of French national cinema, yet ironically such films were often so 
expensive to make that producers have to piece together financing (in the form of 
public subsidies) from several different countries, as was the case, for example, with 
La Reine Margot a French, Italian and German co-production. Because of their big 
budget, many of these films had to rely on foreign markets, and were produced along 
the Hollywood blockbuster model using foreign actors and filmed in English, as in 
the case with Jeanne d'Arc, Le Cinquiemeelement. The Ninth Gate, Vatel and U o n ” 
On the other hand, it may be too simplistic to dismiss these films out of hand as 
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‘un-French，simply because they use an international cast speaking in English. 
American films had been part of the French cinematic landscape for the better part of 
a century, so it is not surprising that many French filmmakers feel their influence. 
Therefore, why is it that when Hollywood genre conventions crop up in films by 
Truffaut and Godard, no one questions the cultural authenticity of those films, but 
when they appear in a Luc Besson film, people are quick to cry, 'sell-out'? 
However, it is also the case that French film policy is riddled with loopholes and 
inconsistensies in its implementation. The recent case of the box office hit A Very 
Long Engagement how controversial national definition can be, particularly when 
large sums of money is involved. When the CNC ruled that the film qualified it for 
the compte de soutien, a group of French producers went to court to contest the ruling, 
arguing that the film, despite having a French director, scriptwriter, technicians and 
actors speaking in French, was filmed and post-produced in France, was not French 
because it was produced by a company 32% owned by Warner Brothers. 
Astonishingly, the court sided with the producers and ruled that the film was not 
eligible to receive the 3.5 million euros due to it from the compte de soutien” 
However, Oliver Stone's Alexander, shot in Morocco in English with 
English-speaking actors, did qualify for French support because it was produced by 
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the French studio Pathe! 
This brief survey into French film policy demonstrates the tension between 
industry and cultural demands. In order to capture a larger share of the national box 
office, film policies often have to favour blockbusters produced by large 
conglomerates. Imposing too narrow a definition upon national cinema—for 
example, by insisting that only certain modes of production (independent, artisan 
projects) or certain types of films (auteurist) count as French is to demonize a large 
part of the film industry. On the other hand, opening up the definition of national 
cinema too widely threatens to empty the concept of cultural content so that a French 
film means nothing more than a film financed by a French-based company, as in the 
case with those French-financed Hollywood films. In the next section, I will show 
that the evolution of film policy in Canada over the past forty years is also fraught 
with tensions between achieving industry and cultural development. 
Film Policy in Canada 
Feature film output in Canada was negligible until the late 1960s，with annual 
output ranging from one to eleven films a year between 1960 and 1968.^^ Until the 
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1970s, many film talents such as Sidney Furie and Norman Jewison have had to 
emigrate to England or America to develop their careers. The origin of a distinctly 
Canadian filmmaking tradition started with the creation of the National Film Board of 
Canada (NFB) in 1939.88 Headed by famed British documentary filmmaker John 
Grierson, the organization specialized in the production of documentaries that dealt 
with Canadian subject matters. In the 1960s, several feature-length documentaries 
made at the NFB became critical and commercial successes, which alerted the nation 
to the fact that feature filmmaking was a viable option for the country, and calls began 
to be made to the government for the support of a Canadian film industry. ^ ^ 
In response to pressures from filmmakers and distributors, the government 
eventually established the Canadian Film Development Corporation (CFDC) in 1967 
to support an indigenous feature film industry.卯 Modeled on the National Film 
Finance Corporation in the United Kingdom, the CFDC was to invest in Canadian 
feature film productions in return for a share in the proceeds that the film generated. 
The state acted as a venture capitalist, investing in productions that were likely to be 
profitable. By creating the CFDC, the government made a clear distinction between 
commercial cinema and non-commercial film forms such as shorts and documentaries, 
which remained under the aegis of the NFB, thereby reifying the distinction between 
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culture and economics.^^ Despite its emphasis on profit making, of the 103 projects 
the CFDC invested in between 1968 and 1978，only five returned a profit to the 
corporation.^^ Yet the main reason for the box-office failure of most Canadian films 
had less to do with their quality than access to exhibition. 
Even though most of the country's theatre chains were Canadian owned, they 
had long-standing exhibition arrangements with major American studios and their 
distribution subsidiaries. Exhibition windows, especially during the more popular 
movie-going periods such as the summer and major holidays, were locked up a year 
or more in advance by potential blockbusters from studios. In addition, as a result of 
block-booking practices, lower-grade films from the studios also occupied playing 
time on major circuits.^^ Only when studio films did not perform as well as expected 
were other films slotted in as fillers in the schedule, but those were often not the best 
play dates on the schedule. Hence, with the major theatre chains controlling most of 
the first-run theatre screens in the country, particularly in the most profitable 
metropolitan areas，94 was difficult for Canadian-made feature films to reach their 
national audience. 
Another problem area for Canadian films in the supply chain was distribution. 
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The main distributors一Paramount, Universal, MGM，Warners, Columbia and 
Fox—were owned by the major studios and mainly distributed their products. Of the 
more than one hundred Canadian features produced between 1967 and 1977，only 
fifteen were distributed by the majors, while the rest were handled by independent 
distributors. As mentioned above, it was difficult for independent distributors to 
secure good play dates for their films, but even the Canadian films that were picked 
up by American distributors were often side-lined in favour of the studios' own 
productions. In addition, the Canadian distributors found it difficult to obtain 
separate Canadian rights for many foreign films, since American distributors typically 
included Canada in their distribution agreements, using the leverage of a larger 
market to entice foreign sales agents.^^ In effect, the major American conglomerates 
treated Canada as a colony within the greater North American market, which had a 
detrimental effect on the development of the Canadian distribution sector. 
These limitations eventually drove thousands of industry workers, unions and 
industry professionals to lobby the government for state intervention in order to 
achieve national determination of the film industry. In 1973, they formed the 
Council of Canadian Filmmakers to persuade the government to impose quotas on 
foreign films and a special tax on the earnings of American majors in Canada. 
Anthony Leong et al, "The Film Distribution Industry in Canada", 
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However, the powerful US motion picture lobby, the Motion Picture Export 
Association of America (MPEAA) was able to convince the Canadian government 
not to pursue film quotas and cinema tax by promising greater access to the American 
market for Canadian films.^^ Time and again since the 1970s the US lobby had been 
successful in blocking any attempt by the Canadian government to restructure film 
distribution and exhibition in the country, and the problem of screen access still 
remained to this day. One recent study indicated that only 2.5% of theatres in 
Canada will play Canadian films.^^ Instead of confronting Hollywood hegemony, 
Canada chose instead to provide subsidies to indigenous distributors and look for new 
means to boost production. 
In 1974, the government, in response to calls for greater national autonomy in 
the film industry, introduced the Capital Cost Allowance Program (CCA), which 
QQ 
allowed for 100 per cent tax write-offs against investment in Canadian films. The 
scheme brought new venture capital into the film industry, and many people in the 
professional fields, such as doctors, lawyers and engineers who were in the 50% tax 
bracket invested in films to lower their tax burden. As a result of the CCA, the 
number of feature films produced rose dramatically from 3 in 1974 to 66 in 1979.^^ 
But many of the films produced under the scheme were never released, either due to 
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their poor quality or the inherent problem of screen access . • However, ironically it 
was the more commercially successful films that became the cause for controversy, 
like the 1979 film Meatballs, a raunchy teen comedy set in a summer camp or the 
1982 film Porky 's, a raunchy teen comedy set in Florida circa 1954. Despite being 
some of the highest grossing Canadian films in history, critics dismissed such films as 
purely commercial enterprises lacking any identifiably Canadian cultural elements. 
But if one is to use the definition of national cinema espoused so far in this essay, 
then one has to admit (however grudgingly) that they, too, represent a part of 
Canadian national cinema. Yet given the overarching importance of film policy 
upon indigenous film production in Canada, it is legitimate to ask whether such films 
ought to be the only kind of Canadian films available. Not only were many films 
produced under CCA culturally undistinguished, they were not very useful for 
developing Canada's film industry, for most of the profits ended up going to 
American studios. For example, Meatballs was subsequently sold to Paramount 
Pictures, and ended up grossing millions at the box o f f i c e � � Another film，Running 
(1979), starring American actors Michael Douglas and Susan Anspach, received 
CFDC funding due to a point system that gave credit to creative personnel of 
Canadian origin including actors, writers, directors and producers. Many Canadians 
10�Ibid. , 178 
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bemoaned the fact that Canadian tax dollars were used to subsidize what were 
essentially American films as well as the denigration Canada's national image when it 
became known as the B-movie capital for churning out various derivatives of popular 
American genre films. 102 This led eventually to the scrapping of the CCA scheme. 
In the mid-1990s，Canada re-fashioned the CCA into the Canadian Film or 
Video Production Tax Credit, which reimbursed producers on a portion of their 
expenses, and the Film or Video Production Services Tax Credits, which specifically 
targeted so-called runaway productions from A m e r i c a , i � ] in the transition from 
CCA to the tax credit schemes, Canada's film policy had shifted from cultural 
creation to job creation. The policy transformed Canada into a branch plant for 
American studios ！。々 ，attracting American film productions to be shot in Canada. 
These so-called runaway productions had the perverse effect of de-nationizing 
Canada cinematically. In many of these films Canada stands in for America, and 
Canadian streets are dressed to look American, with Canadian newspaper boxes and 
phone booths replaced with American ones. In a country already inundated with US 
media and images, it was ironic that the government's film policies contributed to the 
collective perception that Canada was the fifty-first state of America. 
Some attempts to tackle the chronic distribution problem were made in 1988 
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with the adoption of the Film Distribution Policy. The original legislation contained 
clauses that limited the majors to distributing only those films for which they held 
proprietary rights (world rights or films in which they had made a substantial 
financial investment), but vigorous lobbying by the MPEAA again proved successful 
in significantly watering down the legislation. ^ ^^  In the end, the law contained 
grandfather clauses that maintained the existing market domination of the American 
majors. However, the adoption of the policy did help a number of indigenous 
distributors enter the market, among which is Alliance Releasing (later Alliance 
Atlantis), which had since become one of the most prominent art house distribution 
companies in North America. 
The aspiration to creating a national cinema continued with the establishment of 
a feature film fund, administered by Telefilm Canada, which was refashioned from 
CFDC in 1986. The new name reflected the organization's commitment to 
improving Canadian access in television as well as film. While Telefilm's funding 
had made possible a vibrant Canadian television industry thanks to broadcasting 
legislation that specified 35% Canadian con ten t^ f i lm policy remained a 
problematic area, with American films capturing up to 98% of the domestic box 
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o f f i c e . In 2000, the federal government, after an extensive consultation process 
that involved policy makers, filmmakers, industry professions and the general public, 
announced a new feature film policy. Entitled 'From Script to Screen，，the new plan 
doubled federal investment towards feature film production, and aimed to capture 5% 
of the domestic market within five years, up from the current level of 2-4%}^^ This 
target was narrowly missed, and the domestic take of the box office stood at 4.3% in 
2006，but this figure belied the wide discrepancy between English Canada and 
Quebec. In the former, domestic films managed to attract only 1.9% of the total box 
office, while in Quebec, because of the language barrier and popular support for 
indigenous films, the figure was 17.2% in 2 0 0 6 . ‘ I n another sign that Telefilm's 
film policy was not working, at least for English Canada, was the decision by 
Alliance-Atlantis，the country's largest producer of film and television and the 
recipient of tens of millions of dollars in state subsidy via various Telefilm programs, 
to close its production arm in 2003."° 
Telefilm's recent market-oriented approach had drawn criticisms that it had 
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focused too much on industrial/economic objectives and not sufficiently on cultural 
ones.'' 1 By emphasizing domestic box office share as its main goal, the policy 
downplayed cultural considerations. Indeed, the new policy never explicitly 
mentioned 'national identity', and relegated auteur driven projects into the low budget 
funding category while prioritizing higher budget commercial films.^^^ In recent 
years, Telefilm introduced a "performance envelope" system that gave credits to 
producers of films that have performed well at the box office. Driven to make 
commercially successful films, Canadian producers have begun to chum out 
Hollywood-style genre films like science fiction or horror films, just as they did in the 
1970s. 113 But with a much smaller production and promotion budget than their 
Hollywood counterpart and no recognizable stars, such films often failed at the box 
office. Given the cultural similarity between the United States and Canada, the 
cultural discount factor is almost nil for American films in English Canada, so it was 
not surprising that Canadian audiences preferred the higher budgeted and well 
promoted American products. In reifying the dichotomy between 'art' and 
'commerce' while favouring the latter, Canada's feature film policy have created 
scores of artistically undistinguished films that were also commercial failures. 
111 James David Dean Piecowye, "The Contradictions of Culture and Commerce in Telefilm Canada's 
feature Film Fund 1981-1998, PhD Thesis, University of Montreal. April, 2002, 196 
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In any case, the obsession over domestic box office figures revealed an inherent 
bias in cinemas as an exhibition site, ignoring the fact that Canadians watch far more 
films at other locations, such as television or on v i d e o . A c c o r d i n g to Andrew 
Higson's conception of national cinema, it encompassed all aspects of production, 
consumption and exhibition^ 15，and the claim that the space of film was the cinema 
may be an increasingly arcane one in the age of digitization and globalization.'^^ 
Film policy ought to reflect the heterogeneity of viewing conditions as well as the 
international reception of the national cinema. By contrast, France's film policy 
already takes into account television as one of the main sites of consumption for films, 
and requires television stations to contribute financially to film productions. In 
Canada, the government continues to be the main sponsor of Canadian cinema, and 
the recent funding crunch in Quebec (due to rising costs and the increase in the 
number of projects seeking funding which, ironically, is a result of the success of that 
province's cinema''^) shows the weakness of this funding model. Canadian film 
policy privileges theatrical exhibition both in its stated objective to capture a certain 
percentage of the box office and in the type of projects it funds. Yet by allowing the 
structure of American-dominated distribution system to remain, the policy may be 
"4 Charles Arcand, Screen traffic : movies, multiplexes, and global culture (Durham : Duke University 
Press, 2003), 183. 
"5 Andrew Higson, Waving the flag, Constructing a National Cinema in Britain (Oxford: Claredon 
Press, 1995)，8 
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doomed to failure. 
With its emphasis on sustaining a viable, theatrically based film industry, the 
cultural aspect of cinema is relegated to the sidelines. As mentioned above, Telefilm 
Canada relegates cultural films to a lower funding category. In addition, many of 
the cultural agencies including the Ontario Arts Council and Canada Council that 
have given many artistically distinguished filmmakers such as Atom Egoyan, Bruce 
McDonald and Patricia Rozema their start, have all had their budgets slashed since 
the 1 9 9 0 s . 118 Yet over the last twenty years, it had been the edgy and culturally 
distinctive films made by these directors that had garnered the most acclaim for 
Canadian cinema on the world stage, as well as being commercially successful. For 
example, Winnipeg auteur Guy Madden's The Saddest Music in the World (2003) 
earned only $200,000 in Canada, but its world-wide gross was well over $1 
m i l l i o n ? 19 By not taking into account worldwide box office in calculating 
performance envelopes, Telefilm's funding policy ignores the international reception 
of national cinema. As Thomas Elsasser notes of New German Cinema, national 
cinemas are sometimes invented abroad and re-imported into their home countries to 
be recognized as such. National cinemas are not limited to the nation but are also 
Laura Lind, "Show Me the Mountie", Eye Weekly, 3 July 97， 
http://www.eve.net/eve/issue/issue 07.03.97/film/reellife.php. accessed 19 December 2006 
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intrinsically international, appearing at home as mundane cinema but abroad as 
'other' cinema, and valued for their cultural difference. The failure of Canada's film 
policy lies in its inability to find a balance between sustaining a film industry and 
nurturing a distinct culture. At the same time, its American dominated distribution 
sector has made it difficult for English-language Canadian films to find an audience 
on screen, while French Canadian films have become a victim of its own success, 
with public funding unable to respond in a timely way to rising costs and audience 
demand. Finally, film policy in Canada does not adequately take into account the 
varied sites of reception of its national cinema. Compared to Canada, Korea's film 
policy is more successful in helping the industry achieve a national audience through 
stimulating production while using screen quotas to guarantee screen time for Korean 
films. 
Film Policy in South Korea 
The Korean film industry, after a period of relative prosperity in the 1950s and 
1960s, fell into a decline in the 1980s and early 1990s, mainly as a result of restrictive 
government film policies. From the 1960s to 1980s, the government tightly 
� Dal Yong Jin, "Cultural Policies in Korea's Contemporary films under neoliberal globalization", 
Media, Culture and Society, Vol 28(1)，p. 7 
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controlled the cultural industries, including cinema, through regulation and ownership 
requirements. Film producers and production companies, for example, had to be 
1 oo 
registered with the government, and films scripts had to be pre-approved before 
being granted the permission to shoot. Politically sensitive topics were heavily 
censored，123 and the government at times even induced filmmakers to include official 
propaganda into their films. i24 The effect of these restrictions was that the film 
industry was unable to grow, much less prosper. Film attendance fell into a record 
low of 47 million in the 1980s，and the number of screens decreased from a high of 
717 in 1971 to 640 in 1986.^^^ 
Under pressure from the US, Korea began to liberalize the market for imported 
films in the late 1980s. Korea amended its Film Law and allowed, among other 
things, US production companies to establish branches in Korea, abolished the price 
limitations on imported films and the import quota system, as well as getting rid of 
the limitation on the number of copies of a foreign film that could be imported. ^ ^^  
This opened the way for the direct distribution of Hollywood films by US companies 
in 1988. Within a few years Hollywood films flooded into the Korean market, 
122 i b i d . p . 8 
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leading to the near collapse of domestic films, whose market share fell from 30-40% 
in the 1980s to 15.9% in 1993.'^^ 
At around the same time, Japanese firms such as Sony and Matsushita began 
investing in the US media companies in the hope of creating synergy between 
electronic hardware and media content. This prompted Korea into investigating the 
market potential of the cultural industries for Korean conglomerates. In 1994，the 
Presidential Advisory Board on Science and Technology released its first report 
concerning the application of digital technology in economic development. The 
report pointed out that the gross revenue (including world-wide box office and 
spin-off product sales) of a film like Jurassic Park, which was made possible with the 
aid of digital technology, was worth the foreign sales of 1.5 million Hyundai cars.^^^ 
The comparison between the earnings of Jurassic Park and Korean cars was widely 
reported in the media and caught the public's imagination, forging a common 
consensus regarding the need to promote Korea's media industry. ^ ^^  
In 1995, the government enacted the Motion Picture Promotion Law, which 
provided diverse incentives such as generous tax breaks to introduce corporate 
investments into the film industry. The chaebol or large conglomerates such as 
127 Ib id , 3 
128 Doobo Shim, "South Korea Media Industry in the 1990s and the Economic Crisis", Prometheus, 
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Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo and LG all began to invest in the film industry as 
producers, importers, distributors and exhibitors/^^ The chaebol's investments also 
spurred an increase in the number of local film productions, among which was the 
action adventure Shiri, funded by Samsung, which became the highest grossing 
Korean films in history，and was credited as the film that ushered in the so-called 
1 'lO 
Korean wave. However, not all of their business ventures in the industry turned 
out to be well judged. Korean companies competed heavily for distribution rights to 
Hollywood films, paying amounts far in excess of other countries in the region. In 
the mid-1990s, Korea paid five times more than Japan and eight times more than 
Taiwan for the same film title. ^ ^^  When these films failed at the box office, the 
chaebol incurred huge losses. In addition, many of the big budget Korean films 
produced by the chaebol also lost m o n e y . Following the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997, many chaebol were forced to restructure their businesses, and were reportedly 
pressured by the government to divest their loss-making film subsidiaries.^^^ 
Paradoxically, the exiting of the chaebol from the film industry turned out to be 
a blessing in disguise for Korean film production, as venture capitalists moved in to 
fill the gap. Government policy also contributed to the flood of venture capital into 
131 Ib id , 343 
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the film industry. As a result of the 'New Economy Five-Year Plan' of 1993, 
't'j/i 
investments in the film industry was entitled to tax and financial benefits. 
Another factor was the Cultural Industry Basic Law that the Kim Dae-jung 
administration promulgated in 1999. It affirmed the government's commitment to 
"developing culture as a key strategic industry in the knowledge-based society of the 
future.，，137 A total of $148.5 million was allocated to assist the film and 
1 Q o 
broadcasting sector. Taking the government's lead, investment companies poured 
money into film productions in the hope of fast profits. Within a few years venture 
capital was responsible for such box office hits as Friends (2001) and My Sassy Girl 
(2002), as well as such art house favourites as Chunhyang (2000), the first Korean 
film to enter the Competition Section at Cannes International Film Festival. The 
investment companies also set up film investment funds that allowed the public to 
invest in several productions over a set number of years, upon which the fund was 
dissolved and profits divided among all the investors. To minimize the risk to 
investors, 30-50% of the fund could be invested in other financial articles, such as 
stocks. 139 Another attraction for private investors was that public institutions such 
as the Small Business Corporation and the Korean Film Commission also invested in 
136 "The Transition in Korean Film Production Capital", Korean Film Observatory, summer 2002, no. 
05: 16. 
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such funds as special co-partners, which meant that they would absorb losses should 
it o c c u r . 14G The robust performance of the Korean stock market also contributed to a 
glut of money seeking new investments.� As a result, hundreds of millions of 
dollars became available for film production, fuelling the phenomenal growth of the 
Korean film industry. The number of film productions had continued to increase in 
the past few years, and in 2006, there was a record one hundred domestic films 
released 142 
The downside to this flood of liquidity was that investment funds were only 
motivated by profits, and put their money mainly in highly commercial films. 
Another issue concerning high liquidity is the rise in production budget—the average 
budget for Korean films went up more than 400% between 1996 and 2004, thus 
lowering their p r o f i t a b i l i t y . � 4 3 These high budget films tended to dominate the box 
office, making it hard for small and medium sized- budget films to find an audience. 
The box office performance of the films of director Kim Ki-duk, an internationally 
renowned auteur with a cult following around the world, provides an interesting 
illustration. Kim's twelfth feature, The Box, only attracted a dismal 1398 viewers in 
the whole of Korea during its 2005 release, leading the director to contemplate never 
14� Ibid. , 19. 
� Moon Seok, "Increased Production, Decreased Profitability?", Korean Film Observatory, No.19 
Autumn 2006: 14 
142 Moon Seok, "Increased Production, Decreased Profitability?", Korean Film Observatory, 14. 
� Mee-hyun Kim, Doh Dong-joon, "Review of the Korean Film Industry in 2005，Korean Film 
Observatory. No. 18，Spring, 2006: 34 
53 
having his films shown in Korea again. While his next film, Time (2006) did better 
with 30,000 admissions during its first four weeks in release, it fell far short of the 
director's expectation of 200,000 a d m i s s i o n s ， a n d paled in comparison with the 
twelve million plus admissions enjoyed by the year's top film, The Host. 
Some critics question whether films like The Host, which was released in over 
six hundred screens nation wide--a third of the total number of screens in the 
country—monopolized film exh ib i t ion]46 This issue is a particularly salient one for 
Korea, since it was one of the prime movers, along with France and Canada, behind 
UNESCO's Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions, adopted in 2005.147 According to the convention, states have "the 
sovereign right to adopt measures and policies to protect and promote the diversity of 
cultural expressions within their t e r r i t o r y . T h e convention represented a victory 
for Korean film professionals and cultural workers working behind the scenes on the 
convention, who had long used cultural diversity as the reason to justify the 
imposition of the screen quota in the country. It would be potentially embarrassing 
if Koreans are actively promoting diversity abroad while allowing screen diversity to 
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decrease at home due to oligarchic release practices. 
The screen quota, first introduced in Korea in 1966, is seen by many film 
industry professionals as the key to the revival of Korean films in the 1990s.i49 The 
quota required theatres to show Korean films for 146 days per year. At first many 
local theatres failed to comply with the law, but many film professionals formed 
watchdog groups to monitor theatres i，。，which provided the first step to their 
politicization. To gain greater access to Korean screens, American media 
conglomerates lobbied the US government to put pressure on Korea to put an end to 
screen quota. During negotiations on the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) in 1998, 
the US included in a draft of the proposed treaty stipulations that would render screen 
quotas illegal. The Kim Dae-jung administration, eager to attract foreign investment 
to Korea, signaled its intention to comply with US demands.^^^ The film community 
united in a nationwide protest against abolishing the screen quota. At first the 
government under President Roh Moo-hyun was sympathetic to the film industry, but 
when US trade negotiators dangled the bigger carrot of a bilateral free trade 
agreement, which offered greater economic benefit to Korea than the BIT by opening 
up the US market to a wide range of Korean products, the Korean government finally 
149 Yeong-jae Choi, "WTO and Korean Film Culture", 3 
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gave in, halving the screen quota from 146 days to 73 from July 2006.^^^ 
For years, Korean film professionals and critics claimed that the screen quota 
contributes to cultural diversity, for without it Korean screens will be flooded with 
Hollywood films. Yet with Korean films securing a comfortable 59% of total box 
office in both 2004 and 2005^^^, the argument rang increasingly hollow, which may 
have been one of the main reasons for the eventual reduction in the screen quota. 
And if one were to take the concept of cultural diversity seriously, it should not be 
equated solely with the preservation of nationally produced cultural products within 
that country, but with the qualitative and quantitative diversity of the production and 
consumption of cultural goods and services. ^ ^^  As Andrew Higson once noted, 
"cultural diversity within a national film-culture may just as easily be achieved 
through encouraging a range of imports as by ensuring that home-grown films are 
produced.，，i55 
Some studies suggest that with cultural products such as films, demand is 
conditioned by supply, and that supplied diversity and consumed diversity are 
positively correlated. ^ ^^  In other words, film consumers make their choices based on 
the products available on the market, and this demand for diversity could be stifled by 
152 IM Bum, "The Screen Quota, the Meaning and the Future", 11 
Mee-hyun Kim, Doh Dong-joon, "Review of the Korean Film Industry in 2005", Korean Film 
Observatory, No. 18，Spring, 2006: 35 
154 Francois Moreau and Stephanie Petier, "Cultural Diversity in the Movie Industry: A Cross Cultural 
Study", The Journal of Media Economics, 17(2): 128. 
155 Andrew Higson, "Limiting Imagination of National Cinema", 71 
156 Ibid., 123. 
56 
a shortage of supply. So it is worth looking at how diverse the film market is in 
Korea. 
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Figure 1. Korean and Foreign Films released by Y e a r ? " 
Figure 1 shows the number of foreign and domestic films released in Korea 
from 1996 to 2005. The trend indicates that, some yearly fluctuations not 
withstanding, there is a steady increase in the number of domestic films released, 
which rose from 62 in 1995 to 83 in 2005, while the number of foreign films released 
dropped from a pre-Asian Financial Crisis high of 320 to 175 in 2003，before 
rebounding in the subsequent two years. In terms of the total number of films 
released, there is a downward trend mainly due to the fall in the number of foreign 
films released, although its number has rebounded slightly in 2004 and 2005. 
One indicator of consumed diversity can be measured by looking at the 
proportion of the top ten films of a country as a percentage of total box office 
admissions. It shows that the figure in Korea has been well above figures in the 
157 Source: Korean Film Observatory, No. 18，Spring, 2006: 35 
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United States and the European Union, indicating greater concentration on a small 
number of box office h i t s . ! 58 Against this it can be noted that there is an increase in 
the number of small-budget films produced. While only three films costing less than 
100 million won (US$100,000) were produced in 2004, seventeen such films were 
made in 2005.'^^ Many of these films were publicly funded, and represented a 
deliberate effort to increase film diversity in Korea. 
The government provides support to the film industry through the Korean Film 
Council (KOFIC). Its annual budget of US$40 mill ion^ is spread out over a 
variety of programs that cover everything from script development and production to 
distribution. Of particular note are production support for low-budget art films and 
production and distribution support for independent digital feature films, aimed at 
increasing screen diversity in the country. Other programs such as the fiction film 
scenario contest and post-production support for student films are intended to nurture 
new industry talents. 
Looking at the films produced in Korea today, they include a variety of genres 
including romantic comedies, horror, police dramas, monster films, war films, 
historical dramas, even musicals. From this perspective they can be said to reflect 
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screen diversity. Yet some critics charge that in terms of narrative conventions they 
merely subscribe to the classical Hollywood narrative mode of temporally and 
spatially coherent stories, goal-oriented plots that centre on the individual protagonist, 
bipolar dichotomy (good versus evil), emphasis on emotional effects, standardized 
plot structures stressing climax and resolution. ^ ^^  By way of contrast with current 
Korean film, it is worth remembering that briefly during the 1980s, a National 
Cinema Movement (NCM) sprang up in Korea in response to the brutal military 
suppression of a popular uprising in which over 2000 civilians were killed/^^ NCM 
films were intensely political works that were vehicles of national self expression and 
resistance to both Hollywood hegemony and government monopoly over film 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . 163 Freely mixing documentary a n d fiction forms, t h e N C M f i l m s 
employed multiple characters and storylines and dispassionate camera shots to depict 
stories of class struggle and popular resistance. NCM was not simply a fringe 
radical movement, but enjoyed wide support among students and workers. For 
example, the 1990 film Parup Jeonya {The Night Before the Strike), a powerful 
indictment of working-class repression, was shown to more than 200,000 people 
161 Eungjun Min, "Political and Sociocultural Implications of Hollywood Hegemony in the Korean 
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within three weeks despite government c r a c k d o w n . � 6 4 
The commercial imperatives dominating the film industry today mean that the 
revolutionary aesthetics and practices of the NCM are no longer viable to Korean 
filmmakers. Yet it may be facile to dismiss all Korean films today as just a slavish 
imitation of Hollywood. While many Korean films today are undeniably formulaic 
and borrow heavily from popular Hollywood genres, they often turn Hollywood 
conventions on their ears and co-opts them for their own purposes. For example, the 
recent mega-hit The Host is not just a regular monster sci-fi film in the American 
mode, but centres on an un-conventional anti-hero and his idiosyncratic and distinctly 
Korean family. Much of the humour in the film is specific to Korea, as is the 
premise of the film, which comments on American military presence in the country. 
It is even possible to read the film, in which the monster is the result of chemical 
pollution by an uncaring US military, as a socio-political allegory about Korea and its 
cinema, in which the local underdog triumphs against a dreaded behemoth of 
globalization. 
The films of the New Korean Cinema readily mix Hollywood conventions with 
the sensibility of modern Koreans, creating hybrid cultural forms that provide the 
means for self-definition. ^ ^^  The rise of the New Korean Cinema coincided with the 
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fall of the military government that had ruled South Korea for decades and the 
election of the first civilian president in 1992, which marked the birth of a freer，more 
democratic s o c i e t y . F o r many Koreans, cinema represented one of the more 
vibrant and compelling means of cultural expression and identification, which draws 
from Hollywood ideologies of democracy and individualism.^^^ Seen in this light, the 
populism of the New Korean Cinema represents not a capitulation to capitalism, but a 
means of engaging with the emerging consciousness of a newly democratic country. 
The uneasiness over the relentless commercialism of Korean films reveals a 
major pre-occupation of film policies in the age of neo-liberalism, namely, whether 
arguments about cultural diversity are merely an excuse to justify cultural 
protectionism or if it really signals a genuine commitment to providing alternate 
cultural visions not just at home but internationally. It should be remembered that 
Korea's film policy is part of an overall cultural policy that includes other cultural 
industries including music, software and animation, for which economic 
1 ^o 
considerations often outweigh cultural ones. National cinema in Korea 
participates in the project of nation building (a la Gellner) not via ideological 
conscription, but through the mastering and exporting of various kinds of 
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technological skills一visual narrative, graphical interface, e t c . t h a t are part of 
modem citizenship.'^^ This line of argument, along with that of cultural diversity, 
allows one to temper the charges of cultural chauvinism and parochialism that are 
often leveled at national cinema by freeing it of ideological functions. Rather, 
cultural and economic self-determination are already sufficient grounds to justify film 
policy in support of national cinema. 
Policy Implications for Hong Kong 
This cursory look at the film policies of France, Canada and Korea brought up a 
number of important issues for the still evolving film policy in Hong Kong. To a 
greater or lesser extent, all three countries have had to contend with the domination of 
the American film industry. To compete, these countries often have to imitate 
Hollywood in terms of styles, genres narrative structures, scales of production and 
marketing strategies. The big budget spectacles produced in France, a well as the 
Hollywood-styled genre films produced in Canada and Korea are examples of these 
tendencies. Film policy is meant to support national cinema，but when the films 
produced are 'merely' Hollywood clones, many question the justification for those 
policies. On the other hand, when those films lose money, criticisms are often 
169 Ian Jarvie, "National Cinema, a theoretical assessment", 82 
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leveled at governments for wasting tax payers' money on films nobody wants to see. 
These criticisms point to what Tom 0'Regan refers to as two 'vocabularies of 
value', one pointing to cultural value while the other connects culture and commerce, 
and agents use both kinds of vocabularies to promote national cinema. For 
0’ Regan, even though the two vocabularies champion different kinds of national 
cinema, there is no need to choose between one or the other. National cinema is not 
simply art house or commercial cinema, but both and a great deal more. Since 
Hollywood encompasses a substantial part of the reception of these national cinemas, 
it is both natural and unavoidable that they bear its influence. Sometimes, cultural 
specificity can be found in the myriad ways national cinemas adapt and transform 
these influences, while at other times it appears at the margins, in art or experimental 
cinema. This type of formulation recognizes the multiplicity of cinemas within the 
national cinema spectrum, and acknowledges that culture is not the sole domain of art 
cinema, but is also operative in commercial cinema. In the end, devaluating one 
type of films while championing others within a national cinema reveals more about 
the individual biases of commentators than the nature of national cinemas. 
All three of the national cinemas surveyed have had to grapple with the 
polarization of the box office in recent years, with big-budget films taking a greater 
Tom 0 'Regan , Australian Cinema, 111 
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and greater share of film receipts. As will be discussed in the next section, this is 
also of growing concern in Hong Kong. All over the world, the business of cinema 
exhibition had become a game of winners take a l l w h i l e blockbusters take up the 
lion's share of the box office, smaller films are being squeezed out. More 
importantly, films that most reflect national specificities~the art films, the 
independent films or films that cater primarily to the domestic audience—tend to fall 
into this budget category, so the loss of this segment represent a great loss of cultural 
diversity. Film policy can help increase diversity by encouraging indigenous 
productions. Government subvention in this area is often justified by the need to 
correct market failure by producing films that might otherwise not be economically 
feasible. Traditionally this argument had been used to champion art cinema, but in 
view of the problem of box office polarization，film policies are increasingly used to 
encourage indigenous, popular cinema. 
The underlying assumption of film policy is that a nationally based film 
industry is conducive to the cultural expression of that country. As Susan Hayward 
notes, film narratives can 'confront the spectator with an explicit or implicit textual 
construction of the nation'. ^ ^^  In other words, cinematic texts can be used to express 
the overriding themes，ideologies, myths, social issues and concerns of that nation. 
171 Susan Hayward, French National Cinema, 9 
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Moreover, certain film genres often have national origins, related to the geo-political 
circumstance of that nation (for example, the western as a specifically American 
genre), but even when they are not nationally generated, genres are characterized by 
national idiosyncrasies (consider, for example, the image conjured up by notions such 
as an Indian musical, a French police drama, or a Hong Kong comedy.) Actor's 
gesturality, codes of behavior and the presence of stars are also expressions of a 
nation. Many governments recognize cinema as an important part of the cultural 
landscape of a country, one in which nationally specific narratives can be transmitted, 
and are thus concerned with helping to sustain a national film industry through policy 
initiatives. As this brief survey into film policies in France, Canada and Korea 
shows, sustaining an indigenous film industry while producing culturally distinctive 
films that can serve as an alternative to Hollywood films can be a fine balancing act. 
Film policy is one of the battlegrounds on which these debates about national cinema 
is waged, as policy makers, cultural critics, industry professionals and the general 
public negotiate the meaning of the term and the kind of national cinema they support. 
As will be discussed in the next section, the evolution of the Hong Kong film policy 
sees a shift from an industry centred approach to one that emphasizes film as a form 
of cultural expression. It will become apparent that accompanying this change is the 
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Hong Kong Film Policy 
Hong Kong Film Policy Initiatives at a Glance 
In 1997，Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa, in his first policy address, while 
acknowledging the film industry's past contribution to the Hong Kong economy, 
pledged governmental support to the ailing industry. ^ ^^  Since then, the government 
has undertaken a number of film-related initiatives, which, taken together, represents 
the region's film policy ！？; These initiatives can be roughly divided into the 
following categories: trade promotion, infrastructure support and financial assistance. 
In addition, the government commissioned a number of studies and consultation 
papers relevant to the film industry, providing it with information and expert opinion 
with which to guide future policy. 
In 1997, the Trade Development Council started the first Filmart, a trade fair for 
the promotion and sale of film and television products, which became a yearly event 
attracting hundreds of exhibitors and thousands of potential buyers from all over the 
world. Although Filmart exhibitors were not limited to Hong Kong companies, the 
event nevertheless offered an invaluable opportunity for local producers to showcase 
口2 Lily Kong, "The Sociality of Cultural Industries--Hong Kong's cultural policy and film industry" in 
International Journal of Cultural Policy. Vol. 11,No. 1, 2005. p. 70. 
173 Until April 2007 with the establishment of the Film Development Council, Hong Kong did not have 
a separate department to look after film related matters, and so initiatives designed to promote and 
develop the Hong Kong film industry were administered by a number of separate departments. 
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their products to the world. In addition, TDC also set up trade booths and hold 
various events to promote Hong Kong films in international film festivals and film 
markets like the American Film Market and Cannes. For example, the council had 
hosted several editions of "Hong Kong Night" at Cannes International Film Festival, a 
press-filled party in which various local film luminaries such as Jackie Chan, Maggie 
Cheung and Wong Kar Wai spoke out in support of Hong Kong films.! 74 
For the past few years, the TDC has also organized the Hong Kong Asia Film 
Financing Forum (HAF) as a sidebar event to Filmart. Modeled after the CineMart 
at the International Film Festival Rotterdam^^^and the very successful Pusan 
Production Plan in Korea, the HAF has provided a platform in which filmmakers with 
script proposals can pitch their projects to potential investors. Even though the HAF 
was open to all Asian filmmakers, there had been a disproportionately large 
percentage of Hong Kong projects, since the forum was financed by the Hong Kong 
Film Development Fund (see below). In the 2006 edition of the event, for example, 
10 out of 25 projects presented were Hong Kong productions (of which one is a Hong 
1 n f\ 
Kong/Australia co-product ion) . 
174 For example, see "Hong Kong Film Industry in the Spotlight at Cannes", 19 April 2001, 
http://www.tdctrade.eom/tdcnews/0104/01041901 •hti-n?w sid=194&w pid=703&w nid=&w cid=&w 
idt=l 900-0l-Ol&w oid=124&w iid=, accessed 12 June 2007 
Laikwan Pang, “Postcolonial Hong Kong Cinema and Its Utilitarian (Trans)Nationalism", 
Postcolonial Studies, 10，#4 (winter 2007), forthcoming 
176 http://www.hLkfilmart.com/haf/release6.htm, accessed 13 June 2007 
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Another area in which the government played an active role was lobbying for the 
inclusion of films in the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with 
Mainland China. After the SARs outbreak in 2003, the Hong Kong Government and 
the Mainland administration finally signed the CEPA, which liberalized and relaxed 
the regulations concerning various sectors of commerce and industry. As a result of 
the CEPA, theatre ownership requirements for Hong Kong companies were relaxed, 
allowing them to wholly own and operate film theatres in China. ^ ^^  Hong Kong 
companies will also be allowed to market and distribute films directly in China, and 
Hong Kong-China co-productions will be counted as domestic films, thus not limited 
by the twenty films a year restriction on foreign film i m p o r t s C E P A also lowered 
the percentage of Mainland actors that Hong Kong films needed to have in order to be 
considered a co-production, which was set at 50% prior to 2003, and was 
subsequently lowered to one third (meaning that only a third of the main cast needed 
to be Mainland actors.) Under stage 3 of CEPA, Hong Kong co-productions films will 
be allowed to be distributed in Guangdong Province in its original Cantonese version 
without having to be dubbed into Putonghua.^^^ Even Hong Kong films that are not 
177 http://www.fso-tela.gov.hk/new/doc/CEPAII-Commitirients.pdf, accessed 12 April 2006 
178 "Film Industry Welcomes CEPA", July 10，2003， 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200307/10/0710283.htm, accessed 14 July, 2007 
179 “Hong Kong Audio-Visual Entertainment Industry", 2 Feb., 2007, 
http://hongkong.tdctrade.com/content___chi.aspx?data=hk__content. chi&SRC=HK—MaPrFaSh&contenti 
d=135&w sid=194&w pid=660&w nid=10106&w cid=l&w idt= 1900-01-01�accessed 13 June 
2007 
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co-productions will enjoy greater market access than b e f o r e � 
Infrastructure support represented another important component of the 
government's film policy. The Film Services Office (FSO) in 1998，administered by 
the Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority (TELA), was set up to help 
facilitate film production in Hong Kong by helping film companies secure locations 
for shooting and obtain the necessary permits. It published an annual Film and 
Video Production Directory as well as a film location guide, listing various 
government managed facilities available for rental as film location. In addition, the 
FSO administered a HK$100 million Film Development Fund (FDF)�set up in 1998, 
1 n 1 
earmarked for the "long term development of the local film industry." Among the 
activities supported by the fund has been the aforementioned HAF, as well as various 
technical training workshops for amateurs and people wishing to enter the film 
industry such as a film production workshop and a special effects operators training 
1 g) 
course. Due to its stringent qualifying criteria, over half of the FDF remained 
unspent after five years (the original plan was to have the FDF run for five years.) 
As a result, in 2003, $50 million left over from the original FDF was used to set up 
the Film Guarantee Fund in order to "assist local film production companies to obtain 
18° Ilaria Sala，“CEPA and Hong Kong Films: The Mixed Blessing of Market Access", China Rights 
Forum, No. 4，2003. P. 1 rhttp://www.hrichina.org/public/content/8721\ accessed 15 June 2006 
http://www.fso-tela.gov.hk/accessibility/eng/about us.cfm, accessed 13 April 2006 
182 http://www.fso-tela.gov.hk/fdf/FDF Case Eng.pdf, accessed 12 June 2007 
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loans from local participating lending institutions (PLIs) for producing films."^^^ In 
effect, the fund was used as a guarantee against which film companies can borrow 
production funding from financial institutions. 
In 1998 and 2000, respectively, the Government offered two pieces of land 
totaling 44400 square metres in Tseung Kwan 0 for the building of a "state-of-the-art 
film studio with advanced post-production fac i l i t ies" .�84 The tender was awarded to 
a consortium consisting of Shaw Brothers, China Star, Jing's Productions and Media 
Asia, but as the film market continued to dwindle, most of the companies eventually 
dropped out, leaving Shaw Brothers as the sole investor. The Movie City opened in 
early 2006 with little fanfare. 
Another important aspect of film policy is the combating of piracy, which has 
became a major priority for the Customs and Excise Department. It has a special 
• • 185 
anti-piracy task force which spends over HK$150 million a year combating piracy. 
Recently the Customs and Excise Department stepped up its efforts to tackle illegal 
download of films on the Internet, resulting in the world's first criminal conviction for 
online piracy. 
The role of the Hong Kong Arts Development Council is also note-worthy. 
http://www.fso-tela.gov.hk/accessibilitv/eng/film—guarantee.__fimd.cfrn, accessed 10 April 2006 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200008/16/0816179.htm and 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199808/12/0812106.htm. accessed 12 April 2006 
185 "Piracy in Hong Kong Under Control", People's Daily Online, 4 August, 2000， 
http://english.people.com.cn/english/200008/04/eng20000804_47344.html 
186 Laikwan Pang, "From BitTorrent Piracy to Creative Industries: The Changing Meaning of Hong 
Kong Cinema", p. 1 
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Established in 1995 to replace the former Performing Arts Council, it provides grants 
to artists and arts groups in theatre, dance, literature, visual arts and, later, film and 
video, among other disciplines. Film and video production grants can total up to 
HK$500,000, although these are few and far between, with most grants between 
HK$80,000 to $300,000187. 
Until 2007, policy formulation, funding and the planning and implementation of 
film related services are scattered around a number of government and public bodies 
including the Home Affairs Bureau, Trade Development Council, Television and 
Broadcasting Authority and the Commerce, Industry and Technology Bureau. In his 
policy address of October, 2006，the Chief Executive announced that the Secretary for 
Commerce, Industry and Technology (SCIT) will coordinate film-related policy 
planning and activities，including manpower training, Mainland and overseas 
promotion, and filming s u p p o r t . T h e Chief Executive also promised to set up a 
film development council, whose members will include film industry professionals, to 
advise the SCIT. In April, 2007，the Hong Kong Film Development Council was 
officially set up, and held its first meeting in May, 2007.'^^ One of the main tasks of 
the Council will be to administer a newly established $300 million fund that will 
187 2004 Annual Report, Hong Kong Arts Development Council 
2006-07 Policy Address by Chief Executive, 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200610/11 /P200610110106.htm. accessed 12 June 2007 
Email correspondence with the Executive Officer (Film Services), Film Services Office 
Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority, June, 2007 
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invest directly in small and medium sized budget film productions. The creation of 
the Film Development Council and the film development fund represent a decisive 
shift in policy from trade development and industry support to direct funding in the 
industry. To understand the rationale behind this policy shift, it is useful to first 
examine some of the studies and consultation reports concerning the Hong Kong film 
industry produced in the past few years. 
Studies and consultation reports 
The Report for Revitalizing the HK Film Industry was commissioned by the 
Federation of Hong Kong Filmmakers in 2002 and carried out by the Centre for 
Cultural Policy Research at the University of Hong Kong. It re-affirms the 
increasing consensus among the film industry for greater governmental intervention, 
particularly as an infrastructure investor. It also provides a number of rationales for 
such intervention. The very first paragraph of the report stresses the dual role of film 
as commodity and cultural production, and is "instrumental in shaping the cultural life 
and identity" of a community. The report lists the economic benefits of the film 
industry, but emphasizes its contribution to "raising the cultural image of a 
s o c i e t y � � . 191 The report goes on to note that many countries in the world have 
19° Centre for Cultural Policy Research, The University of Hong Kong, Report for Revitalizing the HK 
Film Industry (振興香港電影工業政策報告)，October 2002，2 
191 Ibid., 2 
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implemented "strong and effective policies" to further the development if the film 
industry, and that they have done so not only for economic gains, but also as a way to 
establish their "cultural images”�92 These comments are likely aimed at the 
government's film policy to date, which treats film as a mere commodity and stresses 
the economic benefits of the industry on the economy. 
The report contains a number of recommendations on the ways in which the 
government can assist the film industry in terms of policy planning, film financing, 
production infrastructure, distribution and marketing as well as training, research and 
cultural policy, many of which were subsequently taken up by the government. For 
example, the report urges the government to take a more active role in helping Hong 
Kong films enter the mainland Chinese market. During the CEPA negotiations the 
following year, many of the industry's demands were in fact incorporated into the 
agreement, eventually opening up many areas of the Chinese film market to Hong 
Kong companies. The report also recommends the establishment of a film 
development board to spearhead the government's film policy, and channeling a part 
of the Film Development Fund towards setting up a Film Guarantee Fund.!93 The 
latter recommendation was quickly carried out by government the following year, 
while a Film Development Council was set up five years later, thus demonstrating the 
192 Ibid., 2 
Ibid.，6 
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increasingly close co-operation between the industry and government in the past few 
194 
years. 
Following United Kingdom's example, the Government commissioned its own 
creative industries mapping document, Baseline Study on Hong Kong 's Creative 
Industries, published in September, 2003, and funded another research, Study on the 
Relationship between Hong Kong 's Cultural & Creative Industries and the Pearl 
River Delta in 2004^^^. These studies, though not directly related to film policy as 
such, nevertheless include film production as part of the creative industries that make 
a positive contribution to the economy. They envision the creative industries as the 
future engine for growth as society moves from a manufacturing to knowledge 
economy. 196 
In particular, the Baseline Study identifies the main difficulties facing the film 
and video industry and makes a number of recommendations for its growth. For 
example，it cites access to finance as one of the major obstacles for independent film 
producers, and saw the then recently established Film Guarantee Fund as a way of 
Also of note is the fact that many of the industry professionals consulted in this report subsequently 
became members of the Film Development Council, including Gordon Chan Ka-sung, Ng See-yuen, 
Nansun Shi, Crucindo Hung Cho-sing, John Sham Kin-fun, Raymond Wong Pak-ming and Bill Kong 
Chi-keung, further evidence that the government is more and more willing to involve the film industry 
into its decision making process. 
195 Pang, Laikwan, "From BitTorrent Piracy to Creative Industries: The Changing Meaning of Hong 
Kong Cinema", p. 5. 
196 Centre for Cultural Policy Research, The University of Hong Kong, Baseline Study on Hong Kong's 
Creative Industries, September 2003, Executive Summary 
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assisting those filmmakers.^^^ Moreover, it suggests that the government make 
greater investment in experimental and alternative films as a way of nurturing new 
talent for the sector, and boosting funding for the Arts Development Council .【卯 In 
view of subsequent developments, another important recommendation brought up by 
the Baseline Study is the establishment of a film commission. Significantly, the 
study specifically mentions Korea and Canada, two countries in which the national 
cinema discourse had been a particularly powerful influence on film policy, as models 
on which to base the proposed Hong Kong film c o m m i s s i o n . 例 
The Study on the Relationship between Hong Kong 's Cultural & Creative 
Industries and the Pearl River Delta, a consultative report commissioned by the 
Central Policy Unit and carried out by the Centre for Cultural Policy Research at the 
University of Hong Kong, was published in March, 2006. The study examines 
various sectors of the creative industries, from advertising to television and radio in 
Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region. It maps the major enterprises in 
the region, examines relevant policies and identifies areas of present and potential 
co-operation between Hong Kong and the PRD. In the section on film and video, 
the report contrasts the market downturn in the Hong Kong film industry with the 
boom north of the border. For example, the study notes that the number of film 
197 I b i d , 106 
'98 Ibid.’ 108 
199 Ibid., 109 
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productions in Hong Kong dropped from 131 films in 2000 to 41 films in 2003, while 
box office also fell to HK$ 890 million in 2002, down from HK$1 billion the previous 
year.20° Meanwhile, Mainland production numbers grew from around 100 to 140 
films in 2003，and increased further to 212 films in 2004, while box office figures was 
RMB 950 in 2003, and increased by more than 50% in 2004 to reach RMB1.5 
billion.201 The study attributes the latter's relative success with recent regulatory 
reforms in the PRC film industry including deregulation in the production, 
distribution and exhibition sectors. It identifies finance capital and industry 
personnel as areas in which Hong Kong could contribute to the development of the 
region's film and video industry.^^^ 
However, the study does not simply discuss film and video in economic and 
industrial terms. For instance, it urges that the development of a common local 
South China audio-visual culture within the greater Chinese market, and identifies 
"local characteristics and cultural elements" as elements that will capture audience's 
attention within the global film market. Echoing the sentiments expressed in 
Baseline Study, the Pearl River Delta report suggests that the Hong Kong government 
ought to "encourage and support local filmmakers to partake in the Mainland market 
200 Ibid., 61 
2GI Ibid.，63 
202 Centre for Cultural Policy Research, The University of Hong Kong, Study on the Relationship 




in the diversification of film production so as to enrich the Chinese film culture", and 
furthermore, advocates setting up a fund to promote innovation in film as a means of 
"supporting film culture and diversification."^®'^ 
These studies indicate that in the past few years, policy makers and advisors had 
been paying more and more attention to the cultural aspect of the film industry. 
They affirm the distinctiveness of the Hong Kong film culture, and stress the 
contribution Hong Kong cinema can make in an increasingly homogenized global 
marketplace. More importantly, in line with policy thinking in other countries, they 
envision a role for the Hong Kong government in terms of encouraging artistic 
innovation and cultural diversity. These reports also provide the intellectual 
justification and industrial backing for the government to intervene directly in the film 
industry. 
One interesting aspect of these reports is that even though Report for Revitalizing 
the HK Film Industry was an industry commissioned study aimed at lobbying the 
government, while the other two studies were commissioned by the government's 
Central Policy Unit, all three were carried out by the Centre for Cultural Policy 
Research at the University of Hong Kong, whose board members include District 
Councilor Ada Wong and cultural critics Mathias Woo and Desmond Hui, all of whom 
Ibid., 68 
78 
have long been advocates of a stronger, western-European style arts policy in Hong 
Kong. Many of the industry professionals consulted in the former report also 
appeared on the latter two studies, further blurring the line between lobbying and 
policy consultation. Most importantly all three reports were conceived in crisis 
mode-the former was in response to the ever declining fortunes of the film industry, 
while the latter two were meant to offer solutions to a Hong Kong economy embattled 
by the Asian financial crisis and SARS, respectively. These crises produced a broad 
consensus in society that the government must do something—anything~to help 
revive the economy. These studies produced, and are themselves a part of an 
interventionist discourse that becomes increasingly difficult to think outside of. In 
the following section, I will trace the evolution of Hong Kong's film policy from trade 
development to film development over the past ten years. 
Film Policy as Trade Development 
When the Hong Kong Government started to take an interest in the film industry 
in the late 1990s after years of a largely hands-off, laissez-faire approach, it did so 
through a semi-governmental agency, the Hong Kong Trade Development Council 
(HKTDC)�which decided to promote Hong Kong films in the way it promotes any 
79 
other kind of trade—with a trade fair. Film was seen as a commodity in much the 
same way as hardware or electronics. 
At first, the industry had low expectations of Filmaxt. Booths had to be heavily 
discounted from the official rate to attract exhibitors and many buyers' airfare and 
hotel fees were covered by the HKTDC. Many local film producers were skeptical 
of the need for such a trade fair, since they already had an established network of 
buyers. Nevertheless, many film producers were pleasantly surprised by the number 
of international buyers present.】。； in subsequent years, both the number of exhibitors 
and visitors grew steadily, and the' 1ann ive r sa ry edition of Filmart, held in March, 
2006, attracted more than 400 exhibitors compared to 75 in 1997, and over 3700 
visitors, compared with 500 ten years before.^ ®^ In 2005，Filmart became part of the 
Entertainment Expo, a month-long, mega event that combined the Hong Kong Digital 
Entertainment Awards, the Hong Kong-Asian Film Financing Forum, the Hong Kong 
International Film Festival and the Hong Kong Film Awards Presentation 
Ceremony. 207 
A film policy that combines trade promotion and exhibition is one that Raymond 
Williams identified as cultural policy as display. According to Williams, cultural 
205 Richard James Havis, untitled report on Hong Kong Filmart 1997， 
http://www.filmfestivals.com/misc/liongkong.htm, accessed 20 June 2007 
206 http://www.hkfilmart.eom/filmart/pdf/Report2006.pdf 
2�7 Source: Film Services Office, http://www.fso-tela.gov.hk/gui/guide to filming_02_05.cfrn, 
accessed 20 June 2007 
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policy as display has two subcategories that included national aggrandizement and 
economic reductionism, both of which can be distinguished from cultural policy 
208 
proper. The former included national ceremonies like Queen Elizabeth's 
coronation, which were associated with enhancing national prestige and legitimizing 
the existing social order, while the latter sought to justify public expenditure in the 
arts exclusively in economic terms. Williams farther remarked 'how often in 
arguments about public funding of the arts people mention tourism rather early' .209 
These comments were especially relevant to Hong Kong's film policy, which had 
frequently been tied with tourism promotion. In 2001，the Trade Development 
Council, in association with the Hong Kong Tourism Board, mounted an event 
entitled "Hong Kong Night" at the Cannes International Film Festival. The Council 
flew in flew in numerous film luminaries including Jackie Chan, Sammo Hung, 
Stanley Tong, Tsui Hark and Peter Chan to make an appearance. The poster for the 
event featured a stereotypical image of the Hong Kong skyline. The entertainment 
for the night was a fashion show in which models strutted down the tiny catwalk in 
garish cheongsam and the food on offer was, of course, dim sum. The speech by a 
TDC official emphasized Hong Kong as the ideal location for foreign film 
productions. Between the tacky show and the greasy finger food, someone forgot to 
2�8 Jim McGuigan, Rethinking Cultural Policy, ( Berkshire: Open University Press. 2004), 62-3 
Ibid.，62 
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mention that there was actually a Hong Kong film competing at the film 
festival一Carol Lai Miu Suet's Glass Tears, shown in the Director's Fortnight 
• 2 1 0 • • 
section. The incident showed how easy it was for films to be sidelined by tourism, 
even (or especially?) at the world's premier international film festival. 
At the 2007 edition of the Cannes Film Festival, the opening film was Wong 
Kar-wai's My Blueberry Nights and Maggie Cheung was one of the jury members. 
Despite the fact that Cheung had not made a Hong Kong film in years and Wong's 
new film was financed by an American company, both attended Hong Kong night, 
along with financial secretary Henry Tang, the highest ranking Hong Kong official 
ever to grace the event. Tang's speech again emphasized Hong Kong's value as a 
trading hub where one can "deliver [and] source content and establish business 
opportunities.^'' 
Hong Kong, Kowloon & New Territories Motion Picture Industry Association 
chairman Crucindo Hung confirmed that the government's support of the film 
industry was based on the hope that films will help attract tourists. "They saw that 
Lord of the Rings can increase tourism by 8%, so its promotional effect is quite large. 
210 For an account of the event see Man See chung, "Looking at Hong Kong Film Policy through 
'Hong Kong Night in Canne"，Hong Kong Economic Journal, June 2001.(文思聰，“到康城影展掛 
羊頭一從「香港之夜J看電影政策，信報，2001年六月）Man See Chung is the author's pen name. 
Speech by Financial Secretary Mr Henry Tang at the Inauguration Ceremony of Photo Exhibition 
Celebrating the 60th Anniversary of Festival de Cannes cum Cocktail Reception in Cannes of France 
(May 18，2007), http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200705/19/P200705190011 .htm, accessed 19 June 
2007 
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Using these examples we help government officials understand, and they agree to 
support the film industry. 
Clearly, in GDP terms, the film industry was easily dwarfed by tour ism^and 
judging from Hung's comments, many in the film industry were content to use 
tourism as a bait to solicit the government's support for cinema. However, there was 
a world of difference between supporting cinema for its own sake and doing so 
because it might help attract more tourists. The latter depended upon safe, 
stereotypical and sanitized images tailored for the tourist gaze, just the kind of images 
the Secretary for Industry, Commerce and Trade would have wanted the Film 
Development Fund to produce had he got his way. On the other hand cinema, like 
all art, often deals with unsavory subject matters and exposes social problems, and 
may not fit in with images usually associated with tourist brochures. Lord of the 
Rings might have worked for New Zealand because, with the help of CGI, the film 
presented a pristine, gorgeous fantasy landscape consisted of rolling hills and 
volcanoes that appealed to many tourists, but it would be absurd to fashion Hong 
Kong cinema (or any cinema, for that matter) around pretty postcard images. 
Moreover, the Hong Kong Trade Development Council's promotional strategies 
212 Interview with author, 22 May 2007 
213 Local films drew around HK$256 million at the box office in 2006 (Source: MPIA). Even 
including overseas markets and ancillary sales, the take is only equivalent to about 1% of the HK$25.6 
billion (source: http://www.info.gov.hk/likecon/sp/doc/box-05ql-3-l.pdf) that tourism contributes to 
the economy. 
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were increasingly out of step with the realities of the local film scene. In order to 
draw the attention of the world's press, the Trade Development Council have had to 
trot out established, internationally renowned stars like Jackie Chan, Sammo Hung, 
Tony Leung and Maggie Cheung for its annual Hong Kong Night extravaganza at 
Cannes, but ironically these figures have not been active in Hong Kong cinema in 
recent years. Yet with its every shrinking audience base, big stars were increasingly 
priced out of local productions. More often than not these big name actors, if they 
were not working on Hollywood films, were starring in big-budget Hong Kong-China 
co-productions. 
In another sign of how clueless the TDC was with regards to the film industry, its 
research department compiled a report entitled The North American Market for Hong 
Kong Films in 2001, which explored ways in which the Hong Kong film industry 
could further exploit the North American market in the wake of the success of 
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon. Among its recommendations is that Hong Kong 
films should shoot in foreign locations and "produce scripts in standard colloquial 
American English.”之】4 Such comments betray a lack of understanding about film as a 
cultural product, and ignorance about Hong Kong film history. In the late 1970s， 
Golden Harvest, in the wake of the success of the kung-fu wave in America, had tried 
214 Hong Kong Trade Development Council Research Department, The North American Market for 
Hong Kong Films. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Trade Development Council, 2001), 7 
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to capture the international market with a series of western-style, English language 
films starring Hollywood actors. All but one failed miserably at the box office, 
partly because the Hong Kong films lacked the resources to compete against 
big-budget Hollywood films, and also because Golden Harvest did not have access to 
the distribution networks that the American studios enjoy?^^ The 'lesson' brought 
home by the Golden Harvest episode is one shared by many others, which is that with 
few exceptions, the only way for national cinemas to crack the American market is as 
‘other’ cinema, trading on their cultural specificity and 'otherness'. In any case, 
within a few years it would become evident the market for Hong Kong films was not 
in the west but north of the border. 
Meanwhile, the Hong Kong film scene still had to contend with an ever 
dwindling number of film productions as well as a declining market share. In 1997， 
0 1 A 
Hollywood films out-grossed local films for the first time since 1980 ，and the 
market share of the former had grown steadily every year since. In 2006, the box 
office share of foreign films totaled $602 million, while Hong Kong films grossed 
217 
around $253 million, amounting to less than a third of total box office share. At the 
same time, the market for VCDs and DVDs have also declined by as much as 40% 
215 Mike Walsh, "Hong Kong goes international: the case of Golden Harvest", Gina Marchetti and Tan 
See Kam, Q±,Hong Kong Film, Hollywood and the New Global Cinema (London and New York: 
Routledge: 2007), 173 
216 Chu, Yingchi, Hong Kong Cinema: Colonizer, Motherland and Self, 125 
2丨7 Kwok Hin-ching (郭縫澂)，"There will be a lot of local films next year?"(明年很多港產片),Ming 
Pao, 28 December 2006 
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compared to just a few years ago, according to the owner of a video distribution 
218 • 
company. Some in the industry attributed the drop in business to illegal 
downloading, others blame video rental shops. Such shops offered video discs for 
rent for less than $10 each time，a fraction of the $60-200 it cost to purchase a DVD， 
with all the profit going towards the shop owner. In the past few years the number of 
shops specializing in video disc sales dropped by half, while those that offer disc 
rental rose from just a few dozen to more than two hundred in 2006.^ ^^ As the sales 
figure for video discs plummeted, the price for video rights (the amount offered to 
film producers for the right to distribute the film on video discs) had continued to fall. 
Considering that the sale of video rights accounted for between 30-40% of a film's 
income220, the fall in the price of video rights had a direct impact on a film's 
profitability. While the government had been quite aggressive in prosecuting illegal 
downloading, it had been criticized as dragging its feet with a proposed legislation 
regulating film rental, which had been stalled in the legislative council for more than 
two years 尸 1 
In the last fifteen years the number of local films released also fell from a high of 
234 in 1993 to 57 in 2005, and the local box office fell from an all-time high of 
Or Mei, Chung Yat-hung (柯美，鍾一虹)“Save Hong Kong Films"(急救香港電影之銷情慘淡)， 
Ming Pao, 28 Sept, 2006 
219 Ibid. 
220 Chu, Yingchi, Hong Kong Cinema: Colonizer, Motherland mid Self, 126 
22丨 Ibid： 
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HK$ 1.2 billion to HK$293 million in 2006.222 The relative share box office for local 
films also plummeted from 78% in 1992 to 31 % in 2006?^^ Given these dismal 
figures, it was not surprising that the industry lobbied for greater intervention in the 
film industry beyond trade promotion. Meanwhile, many in the industry saw that the 
$100 million Film Development Fund inaugurated in 1998 had also not achieved the 
intended goal of reviving the industry. As mentioned above, the fund's qualifying 
criteria was seen as too stringent, and the activities it funded like stunts or arts 
direction workshops served no useful purpose at a time when the number of film 
productions had fallen rapidly, and there was no employment available for the 
graduates. Many industry professionals pressured the government to set up a film 
guarantee fund to make it easier for production companies to obtain financing, and the 
government responded by setting up just such a fund in 2003. However, 
subsequently the response from the industry to the fund had not been enthusiastic due 
to the harsh qualifying criteria for the applying film companies, as well as strict 
repayment conditions imposed by the participating banks.224 In practice, producers 
were required to purchase an expensive completion bond before banks would lend 
them the money. Any income recouped by the film had to be repaid to the bank first, 
222 Source: MPIA 
223 Source: MPIA 
224 Joseph Chan, Anthony Fung and Jiun-Shiung Wu, "Where is Hong Kong Film Policy Heading?", 
http://www.rthk.org.hk/mediadigest/20070215 76 121331.html. assessed � 2 June 2007.(陳館文’ ；^-
應謙，吳俊雄，“香港電影政策往何處去？”） 
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which meant that investors bore most of the financial risk^^^ As a result, in the four 
years between 2003 and 2007, only 12 projects applied and were approved under the 
scheme, one of which subsequently turned down the bank loan because the company 
obtained alternate funding from a big studio for the project.226 
The Road to Film Development Council 
The idea for a film commission in Hong Kong was first floated by the industry in 
the early 1990s.227 At the time, many industry professionals were frustrated by the 
lack of any governmental departments in charge of production co-ordination in Hong 
Kong. For example, there were no filming permits for location filming, yet the 
police could, and often did, shut down a production in response to noise complaints. 
This kind of treatment was in sharp contrast to the welcome film crews received 
overseas, where city departments were often willing to block off whole streets for 
filming, and provided many public facilities for location shooting at little or no 
charge. At the same time, many foreign film and television productions coming to 
Hong Kong received a great deal of production support with the assistance of the 
225 Kong, Lily. "The Sociality of Cultural Industries-Hong Kong's cultural policy and film industry" 
in International Journal of Cultural Policy. Vol. 11, No. 1, 2005, 66 
226 "12th film-loan guarantee approved", 6 June 2007, 
http://www.news.gov.hk/en/categorv/businessandfmance/070606/html/070606en03002.htm’ accessed 
18 June 2007 
227 King Oi Chu (朱壤愛)’ "The Film Industry Demands the Establishment of a Development Council" 
(電影人怨聲載道要求成立發展局)，Hong Kong Economic Journal, 30 December 1994 
228 Zuni Icosahedron (進念二十面體)，In search of Hong Kong film policy (尋找香港電影政策)， 
(Hong Kong: Zuni Icosahedron, 1995)，65 
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Information Services Department, thus adding to the local industry's frustration.^^^ 
The industry began lobbying the government for the establishment of a film 
commission in order to strengthen communication between the film industry and the 
government, maintain a film production location resource centre, promote the Hong 
Kong film industry overseas, and assist the industry in copyright negotiations with 
• 230 
other countries. However, after initial negotiations the plan was finally rejected by 
the government in 1993.231 At the time，an officer for the Broadcasting, Culture and 
Sport Bureau (later changed to Commerce, Industry and Technology Bureau in 1998) 
defended the government's decision by explaining that the bureau already had many 
channels of communications with the industry without the need for a film commission, 
that there was not much the government could do on behalf of the industry in terms of 
copyright protection, and that the industry should try to solve piracy problems 
themselves. On the subject of whether or not film projects should receive funding 
from the recently established Arts Development Council, the Bureau was of the 
opinion that most films were commercial in nature, and, just like popular music, 
should not receive public funding.^^^ As it turned out, the ADC did eventually begin 
to support film and video projects in 1996, but the Bureau's assessment about the film 
229 Ibid.，62 
230 Ibid., 59 
231 Ibid.，73 
232 Ibid., 60 
233 Ibid., 66 
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industry was typical of governmental attitude towards Hong Kong cinema in general. 
Frequently loud, crass and shamelessly commercial, Hong Kong cinema was not what 
comes to most government officials' minds when they think of culture. 
This 'policy' of willful neglect continued until after the handover. According to 
Crucindo Hung, Chairman of the Hong Kong, Kowloon & New Territories Motion 
Picture Industry Association and the Federation of Motion Film Producers, the change 
in sovereignty brought about a shift in the government's attitude towards the film 
industry. "Before the handover Hong Kong was ruled by the British, and there is a 
big difference between their culture and ours.. .Afterwards we are ruled by our own 
people. We understand Chinese culture, and understand that we can promote 
ourselves to the world through film."^ '^* The comment indicated that an increased 
'national' awareness on the part of the government after the handover coincided with 
a more proactive film policy, and that policy makers within the government began to 
see film as a way to promote Hong Kong. 
The first sign of this policy shift occurred with the campaign to combat piracy. 
The piracy problem had been plaguing the film industry since the early 1990s, but the 
government had not done much about it. The problem became very acute by 1997， 
when VCD shops selling pirated movies and software came to be a common feature 
234 Interview with author, 22 May 2007 
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of Hong Kong streetscape. Piracy steepened the decline of the local film industry, 
resulting in an estimated 30% decline in box office revenue.^^^ There was a great deal 
of media attention focused on this issue, and the industry pressured the government to 
take action. Finally a new copyright legislation came into effect in June 1997, 
giving the Customs and Excise Department greater power to enforce the copyright 
law and prosecute offenders.^^^ Other anti-piracy statutes include requiring all video 
disc manufacturers to be licensed, and monitoring the import and export of disc 
manufacturing machinery.^^^ These measures, together with vigorous action by the 
Customs and Excise Department, eventually decreased the amount of pirated films on 
the streets in Hong Kong. 
This change of governmental attitude towards the film industry occurred in the 
aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial crisis，which highlighted the volatility of the 
global financial markets and the unreliability of many traditional industries, and led 
many Asian leaders to turn to the creative industries sector as a safety net for their 
n 
economies. In the previous chapter I had already described how the Korean 
government promulgated the Cultural Industry Basic Law as a blueprint for 
235 Chau Tak-hay (周德熙)’ "Letter to Hong Kong from the Secretary for Trade & Industry"(工商局 
局長《香港家書》），30May’ 1998. http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199805/30/0529151.htm. 
accessed 18 June 2007 
236 Hong Kong Trade and Industry Bureau, Performance Report 1997， 
http://www.policvaddress.gov.hk/pa97/english/rtib.htm, accessed 21 June 2007 
237 Chau Tak-hay (周德熙)，"Letter to Hong Kong from the Secretary for Trade & Industry" 
238 Laikwan, Pang "From BitTorrent Piracy to Creative Industries: The Changing Meaning of Hong 
Kong Cinema", 5 
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developing the country's cultural industries. In Hong Kong, the various initiatives to 
assist the film industry since 1997 as outlined in the beginning of this chapter could 
be seen as an effort to capture a piece of the burgeoning global knowledge economy 
pie by a more vigorous defense of copyright. 
The western-led creative/culturarindustries discourse, centred on the protection 
of copyrighted ideas and enforced by global trade organizations, is extremely 
•^'iQ 
nationalistic in nature. Since the handover, Hong Kong has made a concerted 
effort to enforce intellectual property rights, which demonstrates its adherence to the 
global creative industries regime. Yet the impetus for this enforcement is very much 
connected to a desire to protect the local film industry. The Secretary for Trade & 
Industry Chau Tak-hay's "Letter to Hong Kong" broadcast segment on Radio and 
Television Hong Kong in May, 1998 was devoted to the issue of piracy. Chau 
defended the government's recent anti-piracy efforts by citing the economic impact of 
piracy on the film industry, and attempted to solicit public support for the 
government's get tough stance using civic/national pride, suggesting that listeners 
would not want to see Hong Kong lose its "Hollywood of the east" reputation because 
of piracy.24° The anti-piracy campaign and creative industries discourse represent a 
239 Laikwan, Pang, "Copying Kill Bill", Social Text, no.83 (Summer), 139 
240 Chau Tak-hay (周德熙)’ "Letter to Hong Kong from the Secretary for Trade & Industry，，（工商局 
局長《香港家書》）,30May，1998. http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199805/30/0529151 .htm, 
accessed 18 June 2007 
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subtle shift in the government's hitherto commercially based approach to film policy, 
for more so than other industries, the creative industries in general and the film 
industry in particular depended on national specificity and cultural identification. 
This shift paved the way for the establishment of the Film Development Council and 
direct government investment in film production. 
Establishment of the Film Development Council 
Despite the lackluster response for the Film Guarantee Fund, the government 
continued to express support for the film industry. In his first policy address in 2005, 
Chief Executive Donald Tsang affirmed film's importance as the "flagship of Hong 
Kong's creative industries", and announced the establishment of a consultative body, 
a film development committee to "take stock of the present state, opportunities and 
challenges of the local film industry before charting a development course and 
drawing up a clear action plan.”24i The committee, which began meeting in 
November 2005, was headed by Jack So, former deputy chairman and group 
managing director for telecom PCCW, and included various film industry 
professionals as well as members of the business community.2^2 According to 
241 Chief Executive of Hong Kong, 2005-06 Policy Address, 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200510/12/P200510120136.htm. accessed 22 June 2007 
242 They include Chan Wing-mei, director of Newport Entertainment Co. and president of the Hong 
Kong Theatres Assn.; Felix Fong Wo, a solicitor with an interest in film finance and chairman of the 
Liquor Licensing Board; Crucindo Hung, chairman of Hong Kong's Motion Picture Industry Assn.; Bill 
Kong, executive director of Edko Films; Terry Lai, chief executive of distribution, Intercontinental; 
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Crucindo Hung, the committee discussed many matters including how to better assist 
film productions and promote Hong Kong films abroad, and submitted their summary 
recommendations to the government. The committee also commissioned a 
consultation report that examined the operations of film boards from other countries 
like Britain and Korea.243 
The report seemed to have persuaded the Hong Kong government to overcome 
its long standing resistance to a film council, and in April 2007，it announced the 
establishment of the Hong Kong Film Development Council. One of the council's 
main tasks will be overseeing a $300 million film development fund, part of which 
will be used towards training and infrastructure support, while the remainder will be 
devoted to film production. The fund is specifically targeted at small and medium 
sized films with a budget ceiling set at $12 million, providing up to a third of a film's 
budget.244 Under the scheme, the government will in effect become a film investor, 
providing funds for up to a hundred productions. The government's plan sparked a 
great deal of discussion among film professionals and commentators. Many from 
the filmmaking community welcomed the move, and hoped the injection of funds will 
help revive the film industry. Other commentators were more skeptical, and 
Peter Lam, Media Asia chairman; John Sham, executive secretary of the Federation of Hong Kong 
Filmmakers; Nansun Shi, executive director of Film Workshop; Suen Kwok-lam, executive director of 
Henderson Land; and Raymond Wong Pak-ming, chairman of Movie Producers and Distributors Assn. 
(Source: Vicki Rothrock, "So Heads New Hong Kong Council", Variety, April 15，2007 
http://www.variety.com/article/VRl 1 ] 7963125.html?categorvid=1043&cs=l, accessed 24 June 2007 
243 Interview with author, 22 May 2007 
2幼 Vicki Rothrock, "So Heads New Hong Kong Council", Variety, April 15，2007. 
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questioned why the fund should go towards small and medium sized films when most 
of them lose money, instead of big budget ones^ ^^^ Still others wonder if the SAR's 
much vaunted policy of "positive non intervention" had been breached by this 
scheme.24e 
Soon after the establishment of the film development fund was announced, 
controversy erupted over its qualifying criteria. In documents submitted to the 
Legislative Council Panel on Information Technology and Broadcasting, it was 
revealed the Commerce, Industry and Technology Bureau had plans to disqualify 
scripts that overly emphasize sex, violence, crime and horror, and that films which 
insult particular races, genders and religion will likewise not be approved for 
funding.247 These conditions sparked vociferous objections from many film industry 
professionals and commentators, who argued that the banned topics covered almost 
all the usual elements that make films commercially viable. Among those who 
sounded their objections include film director Gordon Chan, who claimed that the 
requirement was "ridiculous and an insult to film directors."248 Bizarrely, Chan 
himself was a member of the Film Development Commission, and this incident raised 
245 Kwok Hin-cheng (郭縫澂)，"Shouldn't public funds be used towards big budgeted films?"(公帮不 
投資大片嗎？），Ming Pao, 9 May 2007 
246 Tonny Chan, "Government to invest in movies", 8 March 2007， 
http://www.a-peiformers.com/emplover/industrv Lnsight.jsp?article id=839. accessed 28 June 2007 
247 Yangtze Evening Newspaper (揚子晚幸g) "Film directors question film flmd qualifying criteria"(基 
金審批標準引發導演爭議)， 
http://61.155.236.16:10000/b5/www.vangtse.com/lcpd/cibd/200704/t20070416 283490.html. accessed 
18 April 2007 
248 Ibid. 
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questions regarding the relationship between the commission and the department, and 
how much the latter relied on the former's advice when drafting policies. Although 
the qualifying requirements were later quietly dropped,249 the episode highlighted a 
fundamental difference between the Hong Kong Film Development Council and its 
counterpart overseas. For while Telefilm Canada and the Korean Film Council were 
autonomous statutory organizations equipped with their own budgets, the HKFDC 
was an advisory body charged with counseling the secretary for Commerce, Industry 
and Technology on how to handle the $300 million Film Development Fund, the 
management of which was within the aegis of the Commerce, Industry and 
Technology Bureau.^^® Despite its claim to be supportive of the film industry, the 
government was evidently still wary about not being able to control the content of the 
films produced. The establishment of the Film Development Council and the Film 
Development Fund occurred at a time when Hong Kong cinema is facing a crisis in 
identity as a direct result of the CEPA. 
249 Confirmed in an E-mail correspondence with Shirley Hui, Executive Officer (Film Services) 
Film Services Office, Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority, 13 June, 2007 
25° Vicki Rothrock, ‘‘So Heads New Hong Kong Council", Variety, April 15，2007 
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The Changing identity of Hong Kong Cinema 
According to box office figures, the top grossing films were taking a larger and 
larger percentage of the total gross. Of the top grossing hits at the Hong Kong box 
office last year, for example, a significant portion were Hollywood films like Pirates 
of the Caribbean II and The Da Vinci Code and big budget Hong Kong-Chinese 
co-productions like Fearless (霍元甲)，Curse of the Golden Flower (、滿城盡帶黃金 
甲）and A Battle of Wits (墨攻)乃'Even films featuring mostly local talents and set 
in Hong Kong had the backing of Mainland investors, like Jackie Chan's Rob-B-Hood 
(寶貝言十畫[])，co-produced with Beijing company Huayi Brothers Film Investment Co. 
Ltd., while Confession of Pain (傷城）was co-produced by another Beijing firm, 
Beijing Polybona Film Distribution Co. Ltd.^ ^^ Local actors and narratives were 
occupying a lesser and lesser proportion of the Hong Kong cinematic landscape. 
With the access to the Chinese market made possible by CEPA, many Hong Kong 
films incorporate mainland companies as production partners so as to qualify as 
co-productions. As to be expected, these films will try to cater to both the Mainland 
and Hong Kong market at the same time, but more stringent censorship requirements 
on the mainland meant that many topics that have long been part of the local 
filmmaking tradition have had to be curtailed or modified. Moreover, many subject 
Hong Kong Box office 2006, January 2007, 
http:/Avw\v.hkfllnian.com/newsread.asp?newsid=1986&lang=en’ accessed 17 June 2007 
252 Pang Lai-kwan, "Postcolonial Hong Kong Cinema and Its Utilitarian (Trans)Nationalism" 
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matters have now become taboo, the most obvious being political ones. Ghost 
stories, once the staple of Hong Kong cinema, were not allowed, nor were depictions 
of Triad society, another favourite Hong Kong film subject. The fickle nature of 
Chinese censorship meant that some films were banned outright, while others pass 
through with alterations or cuts.253 Anticipating this, some directors shoot alternate 
endings for their films. In the Mainland version of Infernal Affairs, for example, the 
undercover Triad member played by Andy Lau was arrested by Chinese police at the 
end254. The Triad member played by Leo Koo in Johnny To's Election becomes an 
undercover cop in the Chinese version.^^^ Such changes cannot but have a negative 
effect on the artistic integrity of the films involved. 
More worrisome was the self-censorship practiced by Hong Kong film producers, 
who automatically shy away from potentially sensitive subjects, thus threatening the 
artistic freedom of Hong Kong cinema. Another trend was for Hong Kong films to 
have fewer local references, or set in a deliberately vague locale so as to make them 
more palatable to Mainland audiences. In trying too hard to appeal to the Chinese 
In 2006, for example, the Hollywood film Memoirs of a Geisha, starring Mainland actresses Gong 
Li and Zhang Ziyi as mid-20& century Japanese geishas was banned outright ("China expected to 
tighten movie censorship", Associated Press, 7 Feb 2006, 
http://bilingual.rdec.gov.tw/KM/KM EN/ShowPage.php?menu item id=MI-l 124948787&did=d 113 
9309091 12385 2a69f33f50885eab&setiipFile=content text accessed 25 June 2007) while in 2007, 
half of Chow yun-fat's scenes in Pirafes of the Caribbean: At World's End were cut at the behest of 
Chinese censors because they say Chow Yun-Fat's character of Captain Sao Feng is "vilifying and 
defacing the Chinese". ("Pirates of the Caribbean censored for "vilifying Chinese"", 16 June 2007， 
http://www.stufF.co.nz/4096365al860.html accessed 28 June 2007) 
254 ilaria Sala, p. 6 
255 Chen Ku-chuan, “Election “’ http:// www.southcn.com/ent/colurmTycgc/200511150093.htm,(陳谷J11, 
”《龍城歲月》：剪不斷’理不亂”)，（Southcn.com 南方網，15 Nov.，2005). accessed April 2006 
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market, Hong Kong films was in danger of becoming overly bland and inoffensive, 
losing the very edge that made them popular in the first place. 
Many Hong Kong directors were well aware of this threat，and attempt to deal 
with it in different ways. Gordon Chan claimed that with his recent film Under 
Cover Hidden Dragon (至尊無束員)，he wanted to make a quintessentially Hong Kong 
film. 
From the name of the film to the design of the character, I have 
deliberately made them more localized. I can guarantee that the 
X A 
film won't pass Chinese censors. 
The director is referring to the fact that the lead character in the film is a street 
smart rascal with no ambitions and no socially redeeming qualities. In this respect, 
the film harked back to Chan's early successes like Fight Back to School (逃學威育直） 
from the early 1990s. Unfortunately Hong Kong film audiences have moved on, 
and Under Cover Hidden Dragon underperformed at the box office vis-a-vis the 
director's expectations. Nevertheless the film represented one director's attempt to 
come to terms with the notion of Hong Kong identity. 
Another director, Johnny To, filled his film Election 2 with overt references to 
the Chinese political system，and the film has abundant violence and bloodshed, while 
the bad guy does not get punished at the end. The director pointedly refused to 
From Gordon Chan's blog, httD://gordonchanks.blogspot.comA accessed 14 April 2006 
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make any cuts for the Chinese market.^^^ The result, predictably, is that the film is 
banned in China. To's defiance signals a profound discomfort with the straightjacket 
of the Chinese censorship system. 
The two director's comments and actions reflect a concern on the part of film 
professionals over the very identity of Hong Kong cinema, and whether this Special 
Administrative Region within Greater China can maintain a regional film culture. 
David Bordwell remarks that "Hong Kong cinema is one of the few local cinemas 
ever to achieve the critical mass that underpins a full-blown film industry".^^^ During 
the heyday of the industry in the 1980s and early 1990s, there was sufficient local 
support for Hong Kong films to keep them resolutely local, filled with the latest street 
lingo, fashion trends and fads while telling local stories?^^ Even though overseas 
markets had always contributed a significant portion of industry revenue for Hong 
Kong cinema, they had never exerted as great an influence on film content as they did 
today. 
Another worrisome trend for Hong Kong cinema was the disappearance of 
exhibition venues. During its heyday in the 80s and 90s，there were five theatre 
257 Lo Mik Suet(盧覓雪)，"Johnny To does not want peace, Election 2 gives up the Mainland market 
for a good reason (“杜琪峰不願以和爲貴《黑社會2�放棄內地放得好")，Asia Times Online, 13 April 
2006. http://www.atchinese.com/index.php?option=com__content&task=view&id=15236&Itemid=9L 
accessed 16 May, 2006 
258 David Bordwell, Planet Hong Kong, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard 
University Press, 2000), 34. 
259 Ibid. p. 36-9 
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chains devoted to screening local films. After 1997，there were no longer any 
theatre chains showing local films exclusively.^^® With the downturn in the industry, 
theatre chains have consolidated, while many older theatres have closed, their places 
partly filled by multiplexes, which were usually owned or partly owned by 
distributors with a steady supply of foreign films to fill the screens.^^^ 
The latest plan to set up a HK$300 million film fund aimed at small and 
medium sized productions could be seen an effort to re-insert the local, mundane 
cinema in Hong Kong cinema, a part of the cinematic landscape most devastated by 
the market downturn in recent years. For Tom O'Regan, conceiving of national 
cinemas as mundane cinema "talks to the heteroclite character of national cinema in 
ways that the self defensive ethos of the oppositional and the self-congratulatory 
ethos of the prestigious cannot . "262 According to 0'Regan, what was often 
over-emphasized in any discussion about national cinema were the exceptional art 
films, yet the bulk of the national cinema output were what he termed mundane 
cinema, films that were often ignored by critics. In Australia the mundane cinema 
consisted of the "ocker films", rude comedies that appealed to teenage audiences; in 
France, the comedies and cop thrillers that were seldom seen outside of the country; 
26° Chu, Yingchi, Hong Kong Cinema: Colonizer, Motherland and Self, 125 
261 Cherise Fong，"Hong Kong movies refocus to mainland", June 25，2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2067/WORLD/asiapcf/06/20/hk.film.industrv/index.html?section=cnn�atest， 
accessed 26 June 2007 
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in Canada, cheap horror films and teenage comedies that were produced under the 
various tax shelter schemes over the years. 
The same could be said in conceptions about Hong Kong cinema. In most 
academic and critical discourse, auteurs such as Wong kar-wai, Stanley Kwan, Ann 
Hui and Fruit Chan receive a disproportionate amount of attention~that is, 
disproportionate to the number of such films within the total film output. The 
mundane cinema of Hong Kong~the ghost films, the romantic comedies, the 
melodramas, the gambling films, the crime dramas, the triad thrillers and the 
like一were usually ignored by critics but much loved by local audiences. 
Incorporating mundane cinema into the Hong Kong national cinema allowed us to 
appreciate the full spectrum of the region's cinematic output. Yet for various 
reasons, including dwindling audiences, shrinking budgets, the threat of Chinese 
censorship, the domination of big budget films (both Hong Kong/Chinese and 
Hollywood), mundane cinema in Hong Kong had suffered a decline, and with it, the 
very identity of Hong Kong cinema was put in doubt. If Hong Kong was to remain 
a vital, dynamic national cinema in the fullest sense of the term, then it needed its 
mundane cinema as much as art cinema and major productions. 
At present, film policy in Hong Kong was still in a formative stage, and its 
direction and substance were still contested. After the film Isabella (伊莎貝拉）won 
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the Best Film Award at the Orient Express Competitive Section of this year's Oporto 
International Film Festival in Portugal in March, 2007, it was cited by then Secretary 
for Commerce, Industry and Technology Joseph Wong Wing-ping during his 
announcement of the Film Development Fund later that month, as just the kind of 
small to medium budget films the fund aimed to sponsor. Wong further added 
that the fund's main purpose was not to make a profit but to increase the number of 
film productions. The two statements pointed to two potentially conflicting 
directions for the region's cinema: one was for a prestige cinema based on art films 
that could win awards and acclaim for Hong Kong at international film festivals, the 
other for a cinema with sufficient critical mass to sustain a film industry. While the 
two policy directions were not mutually exclusive, an over-emphasis on art cinema 
could turn Hong Kong cinema into a boutique cinema, like the ones that existed in 
Taiwan and some smaller European countries in which only a handful of films aimed 
at the international film festival circuit were produced every year. On the other hand, 
a policy that encouraged too much mundane cinema could, like the Canadian tax 
shelter boom of the 1980s, lead to a crisis of legitimacy that may undermine public 
support of such a policy. 
"Hong Kong Government to Invest up to 30% of Budget in Film Production"(港府投資拍片上限 
三成)，8 March 20007, 
http://ww\v.sm9:tao.com/inde>:__archive.asp?d_str=20070308&htmlpage=main&:news=0308ao09.html, 
accessed 30 May 2007 
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As with many other countries, appealing to cinema's status as 'art' was one 
strategy with which national cinemas can distinguish themselves from Hollywood, 
and justify public assistance for the sector.264 Yet this notion would not sit well with 
Hong Kong cinema, which had historically been known for its populism—i.e., 
responding rapidly to audience tastes and reflecting local events and concerns. This 
bond with the audience had been increasingly threatened by the market downturn and 
the transnational flow (simultaneously in the direction of both Hollywood and China) 
of Hong Kong film talents, but one that needed to be re-built if Hong Kong cinema is 
to retain its distinctive identity. 
In the current discussion on film policy, one vital component had been strangely 
a b s e n t t h e audience. According to Andrew Higson, national cinema is not simply 
defined in terms of the films produced within a definable territory, but should also be 
understood in terms of production, distribution, exhibition, consumption as well as 
critical discourses. In the shaping of Hong Kong's film policy thus far, 
governmental and industrial interests have tended to take central place, yet to grasp 
fully a comprehensive picture of Hong Kong's national cinema one should also 
consider the reception of Hong Kong audiences. 
In 2000，the Hong Kong Film Development Fund funded a survey on film 
Tom 0 'Regan , Australian National Cinema, 136 
265 Andrew Higson, Waving the flag, Constructing a National Cinema in Britain, 8 
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viewing habits in Hong Kong, conducted by the Hong Kong Policy Research Institute 
(HKPRI). The survey suggested that the most popular sites for film consumption in 
Hong Kong, in descending order, were terrestrial television stations (TVB/ATV), 
VCD/video tapes, cable television, with cinema a distant fourth.^^^ The average 
''yen 
Hong Kong person went to movie theatres 5.1 times per year. On par with the rest 
of the world, the two most active cinema viewing group consisted of young people, 
between the ages of '12-19 ' and ‘20-29��who watched films an average of 7.5 times 
and 10.4 times in 2000 respectively?^^ Among the disincentive to watching films in 
the cinema were ticket prices, the poor environment of cinemas (the most common 
complaints included the non-enforcement of no-smoking rules and disturbance from 
mobile phones) and the availability of video discs very soon after the film's showing 
in cinemas.269 With regards to local films, respondents cited their low quality as the 
main reason for not watching them in cinemas, while viewing them on pirated discs 
was just a cheap means to kill time rather than appreciate the films, and respondants 
claimed that even if all pirated discs disappeared from the market, they would spend 
their money e l s e w h e r e ? ? � O f ways to improve local films, many respondents 
suggested that resources be devoted to improving the quality of screenplays rather 
266 Hong Kong Policy Research Institute, A Report on the Survey on Movie-going Habits in Hong 
Kong, Executive Summary (HKPRI: Hong Kong, 2000), i-ii 
267 Ibid., ii 
268 Ibid., ii 
269 Ibid, iii 
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than on big name casts, and producers should explore subject matters that appealed to 
different age groups?^' Strangely, the survey did not mention improving the 
production value or introducing more digital effects into Hong Kong films even 
though box office figures for Hollywood productions in Hong Kong seemed to 
indicate a preference for these qualities. The survey's respondents were broadly 
supportive of an active film policy, saying that the government should be more 
supportive of local productions by relaxing the existing rules on local shooting, 
encourage film festivals of local films as a type of cultural activity and providing 
subsidies for non-mainstream film productions.�?� 
The survey suggested that despite not wanting to pay money to watch local 
films in cinemas, most Hong Kong people were still supportive of local films, and 
wanted the government to help improve their quality. This seemed at variance with 
one of the expressed goals of the $300 million Film Development Fund, for which 
increasing the quantity of local film productions take precedence. Moreover, the 
respondents saw local films as more than a means of entertainment, but were 
appreciative of their cultural significance. 
Another significant finding from the survey was that the cinema was no longer 
the main site for film viewing—as box office figures have also made abundantly 
Ibid.，v 
272 Ibid., vi 
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clear—yet other film viewing sites including television and video discs remained 
important. At present, the annual tally of Hong Kong films produced only take into 
account the number of films shown on local cinemas, while other forms of 
productions such as made-for-TV dramas, direct to video releases, made for export 
productions and video films were not counted. Privileging cinema as the site for 
film exhibition was part of a historically based, industry-led discourse centred around 
a century-old business model, one that will probably become less and less relevant in 
the digital age. Film policies framed according to Higson's conception of national 
cinema should also incorporate other modes of exhibition. France's film policy, for 
example, channels television income into film production, yet in Hong Kong, 
broadcasting and cinema were still considered vastly separate realms and managed by 
the Broadcasting Authority and the Commerce, Industry and Technology Bureau 
respectively. In the future, as digitization farther impact film production， 
transmission and exhibition, film policy needed to be re-adapted to take into account 
these changes. 
The survey also makes clear that cinema no longer represents the most prevalent 
form of entertainment for most Hong Kong people, as only 21.3% of the respondents 
stated that they favoured going to the cinema and the majority of those who were 30 
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years old or above said that cinema-going was not their favourite leisure activity.273 
Indeed, nowadays with a plethora of entertainment choices available, film may never 
regain the privileged position it once held with Hong Kong people. Many of these 
other entertainment choices, including popular music, cartoons, online games and 
television shows are not without cultural content. Seen in this light, a policy that 
focuses exclusively on cinema seems out of step with the times. By contrast, 
Korea's film policy is part of an overall 'cultural master plan' that encompasses 
traditional art forms, film, entertainment and publishing.^^"* The goal of Korea's 
culture plan is not simply economic development, but the fostering of a distinctive 
cultural identity.275 Indeed, the economic and cultural aspects of the policy are not 
seen as mutually exclusive but complimentary, as 
273 Hong Kong Policy Research Institute, A Report on the Survey on Movie-going Habits in Hong 
Kong, Executive Summary (HKPRI: Hong Kong, 2000), 
274 From the Asia Pacific Regional Center of the Culturelink Network, 
http://www.culturelink.or.kr/policv korea.html accessed 22 August 2007 
2"" Haksoon Yim, "Cultural Identity and Cultral Policy in South Korea", The International Journal of 




This thesis examines the evolution of film policy in Hong Kong from the 
handover to the present. Film policy is mostly legitimized from either one of two 
positions: industrial/economic and cultural. The former stresses the importance of 
the film industry to the national economy in terms of income generation (in both 
domestic box office and exports), job creation and the knock-on effects on other 
industries such as manufacturing (showcasing the country's products) or tourism. 
The latter emphasizes the cultural value of cinema, both in terms of its edifying 
effects on the populace or the contribution of the country's cinematic achievements to 
world culture. The national cinema discourse is a useful way of analyzing film 
policy because it looks at cinema holistically from an industrial as well as cultural 
perspective. This discourse is concerned with the way cinema contribute to the 
formation of national identity by looking at the production and circulation of films 
within a geo-political unit. As a discourse on film policy, national cinema opens up 
the discussion beyond the usual art/commerce dichotomy—rather than championing, 
say, art/auteurist cinema versus popular films, this discourse takes as a starting 
position that all films function as a 'cultural articulation of a nation'^^^ without 
276 Susan Hay ward，French National Cinema, x 
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limiting the concept of nation to one that is necessarily unitary or exclusive.^^^ 
This essay looks at the development of film policies in France, Canada and 
Korea in recent years and draws attention to the way in which the conception, 
implementation, criticism and modification of these policies are influenced first of all 
by beliefs about cinema's value to the nation, and also ideas about the kinds of films 
that best represent a nation (and therefore deserving of government subvention). I 
have discussed the way cinema in France is valued as a totem of French society, and 
how a great deal of resources is devoted to supporting the film industry. This in turn 
leads to a dependency on state support which paradoxically weakens the foundation 
of the industry and possibly lessens the appeal of cinema. There is also a constant 
critical and policy tug-of-war between small to medium budgeted, auteur driven films 
and higher budgeted popular films. Canada experiences a similar problem when 
popular films produced under a tax-credit system were criticized as having no cultural 
distinction, while much of Korea's popular cinema are seen as derivative of 
Hollywood genres. The distinction between the artistic and the popular speaks to 
different 'vocabularies of values'278�both of which belong within the national cinema 
discourse. In debates about film policy, these vocabularies are used to champion one 
kind of film over the other, but they should not be seen as ways of fixing boundaries 
277 John Hill, "The Issue of National Cinema and British Film Production", 16 
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once and for all，but have to be constantly re-negotiated by policy makers, industry 
professionals and the public. 
A different but related set of dichotomies that recur in national cinema is that 
between the indigenous and Hollywood. According to Susan Hayward, a national 
cinema is "ineluctably 'reduced' to a series of enunciations that reverberate around 
two fundamental concepts: identity and d i f f e r e n c e . N a t i o n a l cinemas often 
assert themselves in opposition to the dominant American cinema in terms of both 
aesthetics and structure of the film industry, and construct their identities based on 
such differences. Stephen Crofts identifies three ways in which national cinema 
production comes to terms with Hollywood: through imitation, competition with 
Hollywood in domestic markets, and differentiation from Hollywood.^^® Both 
France and Korea's film industry try to imitate that of Hollywood's mode of 
production—France did so by nurturing a trans-national media conglomerate, 
Vivendi-Universal that took over a Hollywood studio, while Korea facilitated a 
number of vertically integrated film companies through tax breaks and policy 
incentives. Both countries pursue Hollywood's strategy of producing high-budget 
blockbusters that dominate the domestic box office, and are exported to other 
countries. Canada, on the other hand, try to compete with Hollywood in the 
279 Susan Hayward, French National Cinema, x 
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domestic market by producing commercially driven genre films under Telefilm 
Canada's production scheme, as do France and Korea with small to medium budget 
productions. All three countries also have specific policy in place to support small 
scale, artistic projects that differ from most commercial Hollywood fare. For these 
countries, film policy is the ground upon which negotiations and debates about 
national cinema take place. Such debates seek to address cinema's dual nature as 
industry and art, and policies that veer towards either extreme threaten to 
de-stablelyze the very concept of national cinema. For example, a purely industrial 
approach may produce films like Vivendi-Universal's action thriller Under Seige 
which are literally indistinguishable from Hollywood, while a policy that favours art 
cinema exclusively may find itself without a national audience. 
In analyzing the evolution of Hong Kong's film policy from 1997 to the present, 
this thesis argues that the policy is influenced by policy makers and industry 
professionals' increasing awareness the region's cultural identity in the post-colonial 
era. I have shown that the trajectory of policy intervention since the handover 
reflected a change in how cinema is perceived. In the earlier period, with the 
establishment of the Film Services Office in 1998 and creation of the $100 million 
Film Development Fund aimed, among other things, at enhancing "the professional 
and technological capabilities of the local film industry" and improving "the 
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professional skills of the industry's workforce"^^^ it is clear that government officials 
regard film as merely an industry, and the government's role was to facilitate 
production and improve the skills of its workforce. The Hong Kong Trade 
Development Council's trade fair for film, Filmart, also treated film as a commodity 
without acknowledging the cultural aspect of cinema, and its promotional efforts at 
overseas film festivals showed that it was more concerned with promoting tourism 
than film. 
As the fortunes of the film industry declined further from the late 90s onwards, 
industry professionals clamoured for greater government intervention, as evidenced 
by the industry commissioned Report for Revitalizing the HK Film Industry, which 
stresses the cultural importance of the film industry and emphasizes film as a way to 
build up the cultural image of Hong Kong. This discursive shift is also present in 
two other government-commissioned reports related to the cultural industries, the 
Baseline study on Hong Kong's Creative Industries and the Study on the Relationship 
between Hong Kong's Cultural & Creative Industries and the Pearl River Delta. 
These reports were written during times of economic uncertainty in Hong Kong, 
when events including the Asian Financial Crisis and the SARS epidemic revealed the 
fragility of the financial and property markets in the region, and these reports looked 
281 From the Film Services Office Website, http://www.fso-tela.gov.hk/fdf/index.cfrn. accessed 17 July 
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to ways of diversifying Hong Kong's economy. The Baseline Study envisions the 
creative industries as the new growth centre for Hong Kong. Although the study 
looks at culture and creativity in largely economic terms, it nevertheless highlights the 
importance of culture and creativity in society, and asserts the need for policy 
intervention in developing the cultural industries. The Pearl River Delta study, in 
the section dealing with the film industry, also suggests a need for the Hong Kong 
government to encourage innovation and diversity in the industry. In sharp contrast 
to the past, in which film is regarded as entertainment and an industry, these studies 
and reports affirm the cultural importance of Hong Kong cinema, and points away 
from the non-interventionist stance practiced throughout the colonial period. 
With the establishment of the Film Development Council and the $300 million 
Film Development Fund in April 2007，after a year of deliberation and consultation, 
Hong Kong's film policy entered a new era. For the first time in history, the Hong 
Kong government will invest directly in film productions, supplying up to 30% of a 
film's budget. At present, information about the scheme is still scant, but the few 
details that have emerged bring up some interesting issues. In documents submitted 
by the Secretary for Industry, Commerce and Technology to the Legislative council, it 
transpired that the government intended to place restrictions on subject matter for the 
films funded under the Film Development Fund, disallowing films that feature 
114 
excessive violence, sex and crime, thus indicating that the government is more 
interested in funding inoffensive, morally safe films than promoting film culture. 
Although the proposed restrictions were subsequently withdrawn, the incident 
highlighted the ever present danger that the Film Development Fund could turn out to 
be a variation of cultural policy as display, in which policies are used to affirm the 
status quo and legitimize the moral values of the ruling elite. 
Another provision for the fund was that it be used to support medium-budget 
films, which happened to be the part of the local cinema most devastated by the 
market downturn. Since the handover, the number of co-productions with China has 
greatly increased, and in particular, big budget co-productions have dominated the top 
box office spots, squeezing out smaller films aimed mainly at the local market. 
While national cinemas generally have to contend with Hollywood，the Hong Kong 
cinema faces another "foreign" presence: Mainland China, for which it is both a 
lucrative market and a source of finance. The strict yet mercurial censorship system 
in China imposes great restrictions on Hong Kong films in terms of subject matter, 
effectively killing off certain genres like ghost films that were once a staple of the 
local cinema. In addition，co-production deals with China oblige producers to cast a 
certain number of Mainland actors and these Mandarin speaking roles often dilute the 
local content of Hong Kong films. These developments threaten to water down the 
115 
local flavour of Hong Kong's national cinema. 
Hong Kong cinema had always been one of the most resolutely commercial 
cinemas, catering to the tastes of both local and overseas audiences alike. During its 
heyday it had succeeded on its own terms, developing unique genres, a homegrown 
star system, distinctive film styles and locally rooted narratives. This Hong Kong 
cinema, which David Bordwell terms "Hong Kong's most important contribution to global 
cukure”282�is n danger of being subsumed into greater China. If cinema were to continue 
to function as the cultural articulation of Hong Kong, then it needs to reconnect with 
the local audience. It ought to have its share of mundane cinema that originates 
from local subject matters and responds to local tastes in addition to transnational 
co-productions and art cinema. Hong Kong's film policy appears to be heading in 
this direction, and time will tell whether its national cinema can strike a balance 
between the transnational and the local, and also between the prestigious and the 
mundane. 
282 David Bordwell, 2 
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Appendix 2 
Transcript of Interview with chairman of Hong Kong's Motion Picture Industry 
Association Crucindo Hung, 22 May 2007. 
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